Support for building with cygwin-2.5.2 + SSPI

Makefile.in

@@ -95,10 +95,11 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
 	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
 	kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
 	kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
-	platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o
+	platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o libcrypto-compat.o
 
 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
-	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o proxy.o
+	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o proxy.o \
+	gss-serv-sspi.o
 
 SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
 	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
@@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
 	auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
-	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o gss-serv-sspi.o \
 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \

Makefile.in.orig

+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.365 2014/08/30 06:23:07 djm Exp $
+
+# uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
+#SHELL = @SH@
+
+AUTORECONF=autoreconf
+
+prefix=@prefix@
+exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
+bindir=@bindir@
+sbindir=@sbindir@
+libexecdir=@libexecdir@
+datadir=@datadir@
+datarootdir=@datarootdir@
+mandir=@mandir@
+mansubdir=@mansubdir@
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+
+DESTDIR=
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
+ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
+TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
+
+NXCOMPINC=@NXCOMPINC@
+NXCOMPLIBS=@NXCOMPLIBS@
+
+PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \
+	-D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\"
+
+CC=@CC@
+LD=@LD@
+CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+LIBS=@LIBS@
+K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
+SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
+SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
+LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+AR=@AR@
+AWK=@AWK@
+RANLIB=@RANLIB@
+INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+PERL=@PERL@
+SED=@SED@
+ENT=@ENT@
+XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+
+TARGETS=nxssh$(EXEEXT) nxsshd$(EXEEXT) nxssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+
+LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+	ssh_api.o \
+	ssherr.o \
+	sshbuf.o \
+	sshkey.o \
+	sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
+	sshbuf-misc.o \
+	sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
+	krl.o \
+	bitmap.o
+
+LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+	authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o bufec.o buffer.o \
+	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
+	cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
+	compat.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
+	log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o opacket.o \
+	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
+	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o utf8.o \
+	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
+	ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
+	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o hmac.o \
+	sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
+	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+	kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
+	kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
+	platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o
+
+SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o proxy.o
+
+SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
+	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
+	sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
+	auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
+	auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
+	auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+	sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
+	sandbox-solaris.o
+
+MANPAGES	= moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
+MANPAGES_IN	= moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
+MANTYPE		= @MANTYPE@
+
+CONFIGFILES=ssh_config.out sshd_config.out
+CONFIGFILES_IN=ssh_config sshd_config
+
+PATHSUBS	= \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \
+	-e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \
+	-e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \
+	-e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \
+	-e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \
+	-e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g'
+
+FIXPATHSCMD	= $(SED) $(PATHSUBS)
+FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \
+		     @UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@
+
+all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
+
+$(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+$(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+$(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+
+.c.o:
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(NXCOMPINC) -c $< -o $@
+
+LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
+$(LIBCOMPAT): always
+	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
+always:
+
+libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+	$(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+	$(RANLIB) $@
+
+nxssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(NXCOMPLIBS)
+
+nxsshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBWRAP) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
+
+scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+nxssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o readconf.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+
+# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+$(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN)
+	conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \
+	$(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@
+
+# fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o"
+moduli:
+	echo
+
+# special case target for umac128
+umac128.o:	umac.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o umac128.o -c $(srcdir)/umac.c \
+	    -DUMAC_OUTPUT_LEN=16 -Dumac_new=umac128_new \
+	    -Dumac_update=umac128_update -Dumac_final=umac128_final \
+	    -Dumac_delete=umac128_delete -Dumac_ctx=umac128_ctx
+
+clean:	regressclean
+	rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
+	rm -f *.out core survey
+	rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
+	rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
+	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion
+	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
+	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex
+	rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match
+	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
+	rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o
+	rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz
+	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean)
+
+distclean:	regressclean
+	rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
+	rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml
+	rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status
+	rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~ 
+	rm -rf autom4te.cache
+	rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
+	rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
+	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion
+	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
+	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex
+	rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match
+	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
+	rm -f regress/unittests/misc/kexfuzz
+	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
+	if test -d pkg ; then \
+		rm -fr pkg ; \
+	fi
+
+veryclean: distclean
+	rm -f configure config.h.in *.0
+
+cleandir: veryclean
+
+mrproper: veryclean
+
+realclean: veryclean
+
+regress-prep:
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/match ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/match
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8 ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/misc/kexfuzz ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/misc/kexfuzz
+	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
+	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
+
+REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT)
+
+regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \
+	$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c \
+	$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+regress/netcat$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c \
+	$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c \
+	$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \
+	regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o
+
+regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a: ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS}
+	$(AR) rv $@ $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS)
+	$(RANLIB) $@
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.o
+
+regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/common.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o
+
+regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.o
+
+regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/conversion/tests.o
+
+regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \
+	regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o
+
+regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.o \
+	regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o
+
+regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/match/tests.o
+
+regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/utf8/tests.o
+
+regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS=\
+	regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.o
+
+regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT): ${MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS} libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS) \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+regress-binaries: regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
+
+tests interop-tests t-exec unit: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
+	BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
+	TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \
+	TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \
+	TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd"; \
+	TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-agent"; \
+	TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-add"; \
+	TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keygen"; \
+	TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \
+	TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keyscan"; \
+	TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp"; \
+	TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server"; \
+	TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink"; \
+	TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen"; \
+	TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch"; \
+	TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" ; \
+	TEST_SSH_UTF8="@TEST_SSH_UTF8@" ; \
+	TEST_SSH_ECC="@TEST_SSH_ECC@" ; \
+	cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \
+	$(MAKE) \
+		.OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \
+		.CURDIR="`pwd`" \
+		BUILDDIR="$${BUILDDIR}" \
+		OBJ="$${BUILDDIR}/regress/" \
+		PATH="$${BUILDDIR}:$${PATH}" \
+		TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
+		TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
+		TEST_SSH_SCP="$${TEST_SSH_SCP}" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSH="$${TEST_SSH_SSH}" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" \
+		TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" \
+		TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" \
+		TEST_SSH_PLINK="$${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" \
+		TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" \
+		TEST_SSH_CONCH="$${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" \
+		TEST_SSH_IPV6="$${TEST_SSH_IPV6}" \
+		TEST_SSH_UTF8="$${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" \
+		TEST_SSH_ECC="$${TEST_SSH_ECC}" \
+		TEST_SHELL="${TEST_SHELL}" \
+		EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \
+		$@ && echo all tests passed
+
+compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT)
+	(cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE))
+
+regressclean:
+	if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \
+		(cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \
+	fi
+
+survey: survey.sh ssh
+	@$(SHELL) ./survey.sh > survey
+	@echo 'The survey results have been placed in the file "survey" in the'
+	@echo 'current directory.  Please review the file then send with'
+	@echo '"make send-survey".'
+
+send-survey:	survey
+	mail portable-survey@mindrot.org <survey
+
+package: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
+	if [ "@MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED@" = yes ]; then \
+		sh buildpkg.sh; \
+	fi

README.cygwin.md

+
+# NXSSH on Cygwin 2.5.2 with SSPI module
+
+This branch contains the code from master branch plus additional patches
+applied to make it buildable with OpenSSL 1.1.* + cygwin 2.5.2
+
+It also contains patch to enable GSS SSPI feature to support native GSS
+token delegation using Windows SSPI interface.
+
+All applied patches that make this branch different from master are located
+in patches/ subdirectory.
+
+## Building
+
+```bash
+$ WANT_AUTOCONF='2.69' autoreconf -fvi
+$ ./configure --with-sspi
+$ make -j$((`nproc` + 1))
+```
\ No newline at end of file

auth-pam.c

@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
 typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t;
 #else
 typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t;
+# define pthread_create(a, b, c, d)	_ssh_compat_pthread_create(a, b, c, d)
+# define pthread_exit(a)		_ssh_compat_pthread_exit(a)
+# define pthread_cancel(a)		_ssh_compat_pthread_cancel(a)
+# define pthread_join(a, b)		_ssh_compat_pthread_join(a, b)
 #endif
 
 struct pam_ctxt {

authfd.c

@@ -207,15 +207,22 @@ deserialise_identity1(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
 	int r, keybits;
 	u_int32_t bits;
 	char *comment = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL;
 
 	if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(ids, &bits)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+	if ((e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(ids, &bits)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0)) {
+		BN_free(n);
+		BN_free(e);
 		goto out;
-	keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+	}
+	keybits = BN_num_bits(n);
 	/* XXX previously we just warned here. I think we should be strict */
 	if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
@@ -393,15 +400,17 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
 	struct sshbuf *msg;
 	int r;
 	u_char type;
+	const BIGNUM *e, *n;
 
 	if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(n))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, n)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, challenge)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put(msg, session_id, 16)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 1)) != 0) /* Response type for proto 1.1 */
@@ -499,15 +508,19 @@ static int
 ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(struct sshbuf *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
 {
 	int r;
+	const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *q, *p, *iqmp;
 
+	RSA_get0_key(key, &n, &e, &d);
+	RSA_get0_factors(key, &p, &q);
+	RSA_get0_crt_params(key, NULL, NULL, &iqmp);
 	/* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, BN_num_bits(key->n))) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->d)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->iqmp)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->q)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->p)) != 0 ||
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, BN_num_bits(n))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, d)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, q)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, p)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0)
 		return r;
 	return 0;
@@ -622,11 +635,13 @@ ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key)
 
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+		const BIGNUM *e, *n;
+		RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
 		    SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(n))) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, e)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, n)) != 0)
 			goto out;
 	} else
 #endif

cipher-3des1.c

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
  */
 struct ssh1_3des_ctx
 {
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	k1, k2, k3;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	*k1, *k2, *k3;
 };
 
 const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_3des(void);
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
 	if (key == NULL)
 		return 1;
 	if (enc == -1)
-		enc = ctx->encrypt;
+		enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
 	k1 = k2 = k3 = (u_char *) key;
 	k2 += 8;
 	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 16+8) {
@@ -74,12 +74,19 @@ ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
 		else
 			k1 += 16;
 	}
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k1);
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k2);
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k3);
-	if (EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 ||
-	    EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 ||
-	    EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) {
+	c->k1 = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	c->k2 = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	c->k3 = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	if (c->k1 == NULL || c->k2 == NULL || c->k3 == NULL) {
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k1);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k2);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k3);
+		free(c);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (EVP_CipherInit(c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 ||
+	    EVP_CipherInit(c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 ||
+	    EVP_CipherInit(c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) {
 		explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
 		free(c);
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
@@ -95,9 +102,9 @@ ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, size_t len)
 
 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
 		return 0;
-	if (EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 ||
-	    EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 ||
-	    EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0)
+	if (EVP_Cipher(c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 ||
+	    EVP_Cipher(c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 ||
+	    EVP_Cipher(c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0)
 		return 0;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -108,9 +115,9 @@ ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 	struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
 
 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k1);
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k2);
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k3);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k1);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k2);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k3);
 		explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
 		free(c);
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
@@ -128,13 +135,13 @@ ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char *iv, int len)
 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	if (doset) {
-		memcpy(c->k1.iv, iv, 8);
-		memcpy(c->k2.iv, iv + 8, 8);
-		memcpy(c->k3.iv, iv + 16, 8);
+		memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c->k1), iv, 8);
+		memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c->k2), iv + 8, 8);
+		memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c->k3), iv + 16, 8);
 	} else {
-		memcpy(iv, c->k1.iv, 8);
-		memcpy(iv + 8, c->k2.iv, 8);
-		memcpy(iv + 16, c->k3.iv, 8);
+		memcpy(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(c->k1), 8);
+		memcpy(iv + 8, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(c->k2), 8);
+		memcpy(iv + 16, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(c->k3), 8);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -142,17 +149,14 @@ ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char *iv, int len)
 const EVP_CIPHER *
 evp_ssh1_3des(void)
 {
-	static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_3des;
-
-	memset(&ssh1_3des, 0, sizeof(ssh1_3des));
-	ssh1_3des.nid = NID_undef;
-	ssh1_3des.block_size = 8;
-	ssh1_3des.iv_len = 0;
-	ssh1_3des.key_len = 16;
-	ssh1_3des.init = ssh1_3des_init;
-	ssh1_3des.cleanup = ssh1_3des_cleanup;
-	ssh1_3des.do_cipher = ssh1_3des_cbc;
-	ssh1_3des.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH;
-	return &ssh1_3des;
+	EVP_CIPHER *ssh1_3des;
+
+	ssh1_3des = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_undef, 8, 16);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(ssh1_3des, 0);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(ssh1_3des, ssh1_3des_init);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(ssh1_3des, ssh1_3des_cleanup);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(ssh1_3des, ssh1_3des_cbc);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(ssh1_3des, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH);
+	return ssh1_3des;
 }
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */

cipher-bf1.c

@@ -89,17 +89,28 @@ bf_ssh1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *out, const u_char *in,
 const EVP_CIPHER *
 evp_ssh1_bf(void)
 {
-	static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_bf;
+	EVP_CIPHER *ssh1_bf;
 
-	memcpy(&ssh1_bf, EVP_bf_cbc(), sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
-	orig_bf = ssh1_bf.do_cipher;
-	ssh1_bf.nid = NID_undef;
+	orig_bf = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(EVP_bf_cbc());
+	/* block_size, length, flags from openssl/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c:638 */
+	ssh1_bf = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_undef, 8, 32);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(ssh1_bf, 8);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(ssh1_bf, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE);
 #ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-	ssh1_bf.init = bf_ssh1_init;
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(ssh1_bf, ssh1_bf_init);
+#else
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(ssh1_bf,
+	    EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(EVP_bf_cbc()));
 #endif
-	ssh1_bf.do_cipher = bf_ssh1_cipher;
-	ssh1_bf.key_len = 32;
-	return (&ssh1_bf);
+	/* copy methods and parameters from old EVP_BF_cbc()
+	 * meth_dup does not allow to change type and key_len */
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(ssh1_bf,
+	    EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_bf_cbc()));
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(ssh1_bf,
+	    EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_bf_cbc()));
+	/* ASN1 params??? */
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(ssh1_bf, bf_ssh1_cipher);
+	return ssh1_bf;
 }
 #endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_BF) */
 

cipher.c

@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
+	if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, (u_char *)key, (u_char *)iv,
 	    (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
@@ -390,10 +390,6 @@ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
 			goto out;
 		}
 	}
-	if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) {
-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-		goto out;
-	}
 
 	if (cipher->discard_len > 0) {
 		if ((junk = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL ||
@@ -625,7 +621,7 @@ cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
 			   len, iv))
 			       return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		} else
-			memcpy(iv, cc->evp->iv, len);
+			memcpy(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(cc->evp), len);
 		break;
 #endif
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
@@ -671,7 +667,7 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv)
 			    EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv))
 				return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		} else
-			memcpy(cc->evp->iv, iv, evplen);
+			memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(cc->evp), iv, evplen);
 		break;
 #endif
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
@@ -685,8 +681,8 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv)
 }
 
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-#define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	(evp)->cipher_data
-#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	(evp)->cipher->ctx_size
+#define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(evp)
+#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(evp))
 #endif
 
 int

configure.ac

@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh])
 AC_SUBST(NXCOMPINC)
 AC_SUBST(NXCOMPLIBS)
 
-NXCOMPINC="-I$includedir/nx"
-NXCOMPLIBS="-lXcomp"
+NXCOMPINC="-I../nxcomp"
+NXCOMPLIBS="-L../nxcomp -lXcomp -lstdc++ -lpng -ljpeg -lz"
 
 dnl select manpage formatter
 if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ case "$host" in
 *-*-cygwin*)
 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
 	dont_check_for_resolv=1
-	LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textmode.o /usr/lib/libminires.a"
+	LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textmode.o"
 	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin])
 	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()])
 	AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],
@@ -4182,11 +4182,28 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
 AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
 AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
 
+# Check whether user wants SSPI support
+SSPI_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([sspi],
+	[  --with-sspi             Enable GSSAPI SSPI support],
+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		AC_DEFINE([SSPI], [1], [Define if you want SSPI support])
+		AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1],
+			[Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol])
+		AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI_SSPI], [1], [Define if you want GSSAPI SSPI support])
+		GSSLIBS="-lsecur32 -lws2_32"
+		SSPI_MSG="yes"
+	fi ]
+)
+
 # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
 KRB5_MSG="no"
 AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
 	[  --with-kerberos5=PATH   Enable Kerberos 5 support],
 	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		if test "x$SSPI_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-sspi and --with-kerberos5 together, use one only])
+		fi
 		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
 			KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
 		else
@@ -5104,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                    Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
 echo "                       PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
 echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
 echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
+echo "                      SSPI support: $SSPI_MSG"
 echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
 echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
 echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"

contrib/win32/win32compat/debug.h

+#pragma once
+// #ifndef __attribute__
+// #define __attribute__(A)
+// #endif
+
+#include "../../../log.h"
+#include "../../../ssherr.h"
+/* Enable the following for verbose logging */
+#if (0)
+#define debug4 debug2
+#define debug5 debug3
+#else
+#define debug4(a,...)
+#define debug5(a,...)
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file

contrib/win32/win32compat/inc/gssapi.h

+/*
+ * Author: Bryan Berns <berns@uwalumni.com>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
+ *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
+ *    and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO
+ * EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
+ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#pragma once
+
+ /*
+  * This file provides the GSSAPI interface to support Kerberos SSPI within
+  * OpenSSH.  This is only a partial definition of the full GSSAPI specification
+  * since OpenSSH only requires a subset of the overall functionality.
+  *
+  * The definitions are derived from information provided in RFC2744.  In
+  * addition, RFC2743 provides additional information on the GSSAPI
+  * specification and intended operation.
+  */
+
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define SECURITY_WIN32
+#include <security.h>
+
+/*
+ * Common Structures & Type Definitions
+ */
+
+typedef uint32_t OM_uint32;
+
+typedef char *gss_name_struct, *gss_name_t;
+
+typedef struct cred_st *gss_cred_id_t;
+typedef CtxtHandle *gss_ctx_id_t;
+
+typedef OM_uint32 gss_qop_t;
+typedef OM_uint32 gss_cred_usage_t;
+
+typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct
+{
+	size_t length;
+	void *value;
+}
+gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t;
+
+typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct
+{
+	OM_uint32 length;
+	void *elements;
+}
+gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID;
+
+typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct
+{
+	size_t  count;
+	gss_OID elements;
+}
+gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set;
+
+typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct 
+{
+	OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype;
+	gss_buffer_desc initiator_address;
+	OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype;
+	gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address;
+	gss_buffer_desc application_data;
+} 
+gss_channel_bindings_desc, *gss_channel_bindings_t;
+
+/*
+ * Input & Return Flags 
+ */
+
+/* Credential Usage Indication Options */
+#define GSS_C_BOTH      0
+#define GSS_C_INITIATE  1
+#define GSS_C_ACCEPT    2
+
+/* Context Flag Options */
+#define GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG        1
+#define GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG       2
+#define GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG       4
+#define GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG     8
+#define GSS_C_CONF_FLAG         16
+#define GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG        32
+#define GSS_C_ANON_FLAG         64
+#define GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG   128
+#define GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG        256
+#define GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG 32768
+
+/* Display Status Code Types */
+#define GSS_C_GSS_CODE  1
+#define GSS_C_MECH_CODE 2
+
+/* Convenience Null Castless Comparison Options */
+#define GSS_C_NO_NAME             ((gss_name_t) 0)
+#define GSS_C_NO_BUFFER           ((gss_buffer_t) 0)
+#define GSS_C_NO_OID              ((gss_OID) 0)
+#define GSS_C_NO_OID_SET          ((gss_OID_set) 0)
+#define GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT          ((gss_ctx_id_t) 0)
+#define GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL       ((gss_cred_id_t) 0)
+#define GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ((gss_channel_bindings_t) 0)
+
+/* Convenience Initializer For Empty Buffer */
+#define GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER {0, NULL}
+
+/* Default Quality of Protection Code */
+#define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0
+
+ /* Infinite Context / Credential Value */
+#define GSS_C_INDEFINITE ((OM_uint32) 0xfffffffful)
+
+/*
+ * Status & Return Code Processing
+ */
+
+#define GSS_S_COMPLETE 0
+
+#define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET 24
+#define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET 16
+#define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET 0
+#define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK ((OM_uint32) 0377ul)
+#define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK ((OM_uint32) 0377ul)
+
+#define GSS_CALLING_ERROR(x)      ((x) & (GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET))
+#define GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(x)      ((x) & (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET))
+#define GSS_ERROR(x)              ((x) & ((GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) | (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)))
+
+#define GSS_S_BAD_MECH             (((OM_uint32)  1ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_BAD_NAME             (((OM_uint32)  2ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE         (((OM_uint32)  3ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS         (((OM_uint32)  4ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_BAD_STATUS           (((OM_uint32)  5ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_BAD_SIG              (((OM_uint32)  6ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_NO_CRED              (((OM_uint32)  7ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT           (((OM_uint32)  8ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN      (((OM_uint32)  9ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL (((OM_uint32) 10ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED  (((OM_uint32) 11ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED      (((OM_uint32) 12ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_FAILURE              (((OM_uint32) 13ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_BAD_QOP              (((OM_uint32) 14ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED         (((OM_uint32) 15ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE          (((OM_uint32) 16ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT    (((OM_uint32) 17ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN          (((OM_uint32) 18ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+
+#define GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED      (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 0))
+#define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN      (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 1))
+#define GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN            (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 2))
+#define GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN          (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 3))
+#define GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN            (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 4))
+
+/* 
+ * Function Prototypes 
+ */
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
+	gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle, gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, 
+	gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, gss_name_t * src_name, 
+	gss_OID * mech_type, gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 * ret_flags, 
+	OM_uint32 * time_rec, gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle);
+
+OM_uint32
+gss_acquire_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_name_t desired_name, 
+	OM_uint32 time_req, gss_OID_set desired_mechs, gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage,
+	gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, gss_OID_set *actual_mechs, 
+	OM_uint32 *time_rec);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_add_oid_set_member(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID member_oid, 
+	gss_OID_set * oid_set);
+
+OM_uint32
+gss_create_empty_oid_set(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * oid_set);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_init_sec_context(
+	OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
+	gss_name_t target_name, gss_OID mech_type, OM_uint32 req_flags, OM_uint32 time_req, gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
+	gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_OID * actual_mech_type, gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
+	OM_uint32 * time_rec);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
+	gss_buffer_t output_token);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_display_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_name_t input_name, 
+	gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, gss_OID * output_name_type);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_display_status(OM_uint32 * minor_status, OM_uint32 status_value,
+	int status_type, gss_OID mech_type, OM_uint32 * message_context, 
+	gss_buffer_t status_string);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_export_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, const gss_name_t input_name, 
+	gss_buffer_t exported_name);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_get_mic(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, 
+	gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_buffer_t message_buffer, 
+	gss_buffer_t message_token);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_import_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer,
+	gss_OID input_name_type, gss_name_t * output_name);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_indicate_mechs(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * mech_set);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_release_buffer(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_buffer_t buffer);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_release_cred(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_cred_id_t * cred_handle);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_release_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_name_t * input_name);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_release_oid_set(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * set);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_test_oid_set_member(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID member, 
+	gss_OID_set set, int * present);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_verify_mic(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, 
+	gss_buffer_t message_buffer, gss_buffer_t message_token, 
+	gss_qop_t * qop_state);
+
+extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
\ No newline at end of file

dh.c

@@ -212,14 +212,15 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
 /* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */
 
 int
-dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
+dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub)
 {
 	int i;
 	int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub);
 	int bits_set = 0;
 	BIGNUM *tmp;
+	const BIGNUM *p;
 
-	if (dh_pub->neg) {
+	if (BN_is_negative(dh_pub)) {
 		logit("invalid public DH value: negative");
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -232,7 +233,8 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
 		error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, NULL);
+	if (!BN_sub(tmp, p, BN_value_one()) ||
 	    BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) {		/* pub_exp > p-2 */
 		BN_clear_free(tmp);
 		logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1");
@@ -243,14 +245,14 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
 	for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
 		if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i))
 			bits_set++;
-	debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+	debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(p));
 
 	/*
 	 * if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial
 	 */
 	if (bits_set < 4) {
 		logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)",
-		   bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+		   bits_set, BN_num_bits(p));
 		return 0;
 	}
 	return 1;
@@ -260,9 +262,11 @@ int
 dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
 {
 	int pbits;
+	const BIGNUM *p, *pub_key;
 
-	if (need < 0 || dh->p == NULL ||
-	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0 ||
+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, NULL);
+	if (need < 0 || p == NULL ||
+	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(p)) <= 0 ||
 	    need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	if (need < 256)
@@ -271,10 +275,11 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
 	 * so double requested need here.
 	 */
-	dh->length = MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1);
-	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0 ||
-	    !dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)) {
-		BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key);
+	DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1));
+	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key)) {
 		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 	}
 	return 0;
@@ -284,15 +289,22 @@ DH *
 dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus)
 {
 	DH *dh;
-
-	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0 ||
-	    BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0) {
-		DH_free(dh);
-		return NULL;
-	}
+	BIGNUM *p, *g;
+
+	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&p, modulus) == 0 ||
+	    BN_hex2bn(&g, gen) == 0 ||
+	    DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g) == 0)
+		goto err;
 	return (dh);
+err:
+	DH_free(dh);
+	BN_free(p);
+	BN_free(g);
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -307,8 +319,7 @@ dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus)
 
 	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
 		return NULL;
-	dh->p = modulus;
-	dh->g = gen;
+	DH_set0_pqg(dh, modulus, NULL, gen);
 
 	return (dh);
 }

dh.h

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group18(void);
 DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
 
 int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
-int	 dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
+int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
 
 u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
 

digest-openssl.c

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 
 struct ssh_digest_ctx {
 	int alg;
-	EVP_MD_CTX mdctx;
+	EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
 };
 
 struct ssh_digest {
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
 size_t
 ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(&ctx->mdctx);
+	return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(ctx->mdctx);
 }
 
 struct ssh_digest_ctx *
@@ -119,8 +119,9 @@ ssh_digest_start(int alg)
 	if (digest == NULL || ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL))
 		return NULL;
 	ret->alg = alg;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ret->mdctx);
-	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) {
+	ret->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+	if (ret->mdctx == NULL ||
+	    EVP_DigestInit_ex(ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) {
 		free(ret);
 		return NULL;
 	}
@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
 	if (from->alg != to->alg)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	/* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */
-	if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&to->mdctx, &from->mdctx))
+	if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(to->mdctx, from->mdctx))
 		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
 int
 ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
 {
-	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
+	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
 		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1)
+	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1)
 		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 	if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */
 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -173,7 +174,7 @@ void
 ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	if (ctx != NULL) {
-		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->mdctx);
+		EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
 		explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
 		free(ctx);
 	}

gss-serv-sspi.c

+/*
+ * Author: Bryan Berns <berns@uwalumni.com>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
+ *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
+ *    and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO
+ * EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
+ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#ifdef SSPI
+
+#define WIN32
+
+#define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+#define _countof(array) (sizeof(array) / sizeof(array[0]))
+#define _strdup strdup
+
+#define _stricmp strcasecmp
+#define _wcsnicmp wcsncasecmp
+
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <winsock2.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <wchar.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include "contrib/win32/win32compat/debug.h"
+#include "contrib/win32/win32compat/inc/gssapi.h"
+
+ /*
+  * This file provides the GSSAPI interface to support Kerberos SSPI within
+  * OpenSSH.  This is only a partial definition of the full GSSAPI specification
+  * since OpenSSH only requires a subset of the overall functionality.
+  *
+  * The function definitions as well as the accompanying comments are derived
+  * from information provided in RFC2744.  In addition, RFC2743 provides
+  * additional information on the GSSAPI specification and intended operation.
+  */
+
+/* 
+ * Include the definitions necessary to implement some of the interface
+ * structure that are required for gss-serv.c to perform Kerberos operations.
+ */
+#include "buffer.h"
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+/*on error returns NULL and sets errno*/
+static wchar_t *
+utf8_to_utf16(const char *utf8)
+{
+	int needed = 0;
+	wchar_t* utf16 = NULL;
+	if ((needed = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, utf8, -1, NULL, 0)) == 0 ||
+	    (utf16 = malloc(needed * sizeof(wchar_t))) == NULL ||
+	    MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, utf8, -1, utf16, needed) == 0) {
+		errno = ENOMEM;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return utf16;
+}
+
+static char *
+utf16_to_utf8(const wchar_t* utf16)
+{
+	int needed = 0;
+	char* utf8 = NULL;
+	if ((needed = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, utf16, -1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) == 0 ||
+	    (utf8 = malloc(needed)) == NULL ||
+	    WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, utf16, -1, utf8, needed, NULL, NULL) == 0)
+		return NULL;
+	
+	return utf8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be initialized to a function table that contains pointers to 
+ * all standard security functions.  The reason for using this instead of
+ * relying on the standard imports is because the OneCore libraries do
+ * not expose all the functions we need.
+ */
+PSecurityFunctionTableW SecFunctions = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE is a oid value that is used to negotiate a 
+ * a Kerberos transaction using an SPN in the format host@user@realm format. 
+ */
+#define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_STR "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"
+gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE = &(gss_OID_desc)
+{ 
+	sizeof(GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_STR) - 1,
+	(void *) GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_STR 
+};
+
+/* 
+ * This handle is used to relay the handle for the user to functions that 
+ * ultimately call CreateProcessAsUser to spawn the user shell.
+ */
+HANDLE sspi_auth_user = 0;
+
+struct cred_st {
+	int isToken;
+	union { 
+		HANDLE token;
+		CredHandle credHandle;
+	};
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is called before each gssapi implementation function to ensure the
+ * environment is initialized properly.  Any additional implementation setup
+ * should be added to this function.
+ */
+static int 
+ssh_gss_sspi_init(OM_uint32 * minor_status)
+{	
+	/* minor status never used - reset to zero*/
+	*minor_status = 0;
+
+	/* already initialized; return */
+	if (SecFunctions != NULL) 
+		return 1;
+
+	/* get a pointer to a function table containing all the function pointers */
+	if ((SecFunctions = InitSecurityInterfaceW()) == NULL) {
+		/* failure */
+		debug("failed to acquire function table for sspi support.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allows an application to determine which underlying security mechanisms are
+ * available.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_indicate_mechs(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set *mech_set)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* create an list that contains the one oid that we support */
+	if (gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, mech_set) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	
+	if (gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, mech_set) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		gss_release_oid_set(minor_status, mech_set);
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object-identifier set containing no object identifiers, to which
+ * members may be subsequently added using the gss_add_oid_set_member() routine.
+ * These routines are intended to be used to construct sets of mechanism object
+ * identifiers, for input to gss_acquire_cred.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_create_empty_oid_set(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * oid_set)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* allocate / initialize space for this new oid set */
+	if (((*oid_set) = calloc(1, sizeof(gss_OID_set_desc))) == NULL)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free storage associated with a GSSAPI-generated gss_OID_set object. The set
+ * parameter must refer to an OID-set that was returned from a GSS-API routine.
+ * gss_release_oid_set() will free the storage associated with each individual
+ * member OID, the OID set's elements array, and the gss_OID_set_desc.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_release_oid_set(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * set)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* free all individual oid strings */
+	for (size_t oid_num = 0; oid_num < (*set)->count; oid_num++)
+		free((*set)->elements[oid_num].elements);
+
+	/* free overall oid set */
+	free((*set)->elements);
+	free(*set);
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add an Object Identifier to an Object Identifier set.  This routine is
+ * intended for use in conjunction with gss_create_empty_oid_set when
+ * constructing a set of mechanism OIDs for input to gss_acquire_cred. The
+ * oid_set parameter must refer to an OID-set that was created by GSS-API (e.g.
+ * a set returned by gss_create_empty_oid_set()). GSS-API creates a copy of the
+ * member_oid and inserts this copy into the set, expanding the storage
+ * allocated to the OID-set's elements array if necessary.  The routine may add
+ * the new member OID anywhere within the elements array, and implementations
+ * should verify that the new member_oid is not already contained within the
+ * elements array; if the member_oid is already present, the oid_set should
+ * remain unchanged.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_add_oid_set_member(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID member_oid, gss_OID_set * oid_set)
+{
+	OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	void * member_oid_elements = NULL;
+
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* create our own copy of the oid entry itself to add to the set */
+	if ((member_oid_elements = malloc(member_oid->length)) == NULL)
+		goto cleanup;
+	memcpy(member_oid_elements, member_oid->elements, member_oid->length);
+
+	/* reallocate the new elements structure based on the increased size */
+	const size_t current_count = (*oid_set)->count;
+	(*oid_set)->elements = realloc((*oid_set)->elements, (current_count + 1) * sizeof(gss_OID_desc));
+	if ((*oid_set)->elements == NULL)
+		goto cleanup;
+	
+	/* append the new oid to the end of the recently increased list */
+	(*oid_set)->elements[current_count].elements = member_oid_elements;
+	(*oid_set)->elements[current_count].length = member_oid->length;
+	(*oid_set)->count++;
+
+	member_oid_elements = NULL;
+	ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+cleanup:
+	if (member_oid_elements)
+		free(member_oid_elements);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Interrogate an Object Identifier set to determine whether a specified Object
+ * Identifier is a member.  This routine is intended to be used with OID sets
+ * returned by gss_indicate_mechs(), gss_acquire_cred(), and gss_inquire_cred(),
+ * but will also work with user-generated sets.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_test_oid_set_member(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID member,
+	gss_OID_set set, int * present)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* loop through each oid in the passed set */
+	for (size_t oid_num = 0; oid_num < set->count; oid_num++) {
+		/* do not bother doing memory comparison if sizes do not match */
+		if (set->elements[oid_num].length != member->length) 
+			continue;
+
+		/* compare the binary storage of the test oid to the one in our list */
+		if (memcmp(set->elements[oid_num].elements, member->elements, member->length) == 0) {
+			/* match found */
+			*present = TRUE;
+			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* no match found in the list */
+	*present = FALSE;
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Convert a contiguous string name to internal form.  In general, the internal
+ * name returned (via the <output_name> parameter) will not be an MN; the
+ * exception to this is if the <input_name_type> indicates that the contiguous
+ * string provided via the <input_name_buffer> parameter is of type
+ * GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME, in which case the returned internal name will be an MN
+ * for the mechanism that exported the name.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_import_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer,
+	gss_OID input_name_type, gss_name_t * output_name)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* make sure we support the passed type */
+	if (input_name_type->length != GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE->length ||
+	    memcmp(input_name_type->elements, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE->elements, input_name_type->length) != 0)
+		return GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE;
+	
+	/* there is nothing special we have to do for this type so just duplicate
+	the  */
+	(*output_name) = _strdup(input_name_buffer->value);
+
+	if (output_name == NULL)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free GSSAPI-allocated storage associated with an internal-form name.
+ * Implementations are encouraged to set the name to GSS_C_NO_NAME on successful
+ * completion of this call.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_release_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_name_t * input_name)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* validate input */
+	if (input_name == NULL || *input_name == NULL)
+		return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
+	
+	/* deallocate memory associated with the name */
+	free(*input_name);
+	*input_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+	
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * To produce a canonical contiguous string representation of a mechanism name
+ * (MN), suitable for direct comparison (e.g. with memcmp) for use in
+ * authorization functions (e.g. matching entries in an access-control list).
+ * The <input_name> parameter must specify a or by gss_canonicalize_name).
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_export_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, const gss_name_t input_name,
+	gss_buffer_t exported_name)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* convenience pointer to shorten the void */
+	const gss_OID_desc* const ntoid = GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
+
+	/* make sure we support the passed type */
+	if (strstr(input_name, "host@") == input_name)
+		return GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE;
+
+	/* get the lengths of all the parts of the string */
+	/* note: assumes short format for encoding oid length (i.e. less than 128)
+	*/
+	const uint16_t token_id = 0x0401;
+	const uint8_t oid_tag = 0x06;
+	const uint8_t oid_len = (uint8_t) ntoid->length;
+	const uint16_t oid_outer_len = sizeof(oid_tag) + sizeof(oid_len) + oid_len;
+	const uint32_t name_len = (uint16_t) strlen(input_name);
+
+	/* allocate space for the exported name */
+	exported_name->length = sizeof(token_id) + sizeof(oid_outer_len) + oid_outer_len + sizeof(name_len) + name_len;
+	exported_name->value = malloc(exported_name->length);
+	if (exported_name->value == NULL)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* get big-endian values so we can just do a direct memcpy from the values
+	*/
+	const uint16_t token_id_be = htons(token_id);
+	const uint16_t oid_outer_len_be = htons(oid_outer_len);
+	const uint32_t name_len_be = htonl(name_len);
+
+	/* construct the encoded value */
+	uint8_t * output = exported_name->value;
+	memcpy(output, &token_id_be, sizeof(token_id_be)); output += sizeof(token_id_be);
+	memcpy(output, &oid_outer_len_be, sizeof(oid_outer_len_be)); output += sizeof(oid_outer_len_be);
+	memcpy(output, &oid_tag, sizeof(oid_tag)); output += sizeof(oid_tag);
+	memcpy(output, &oid_len, sizeof(oid_len)); output += sizeof(oid_len);
+	memcpy(output, ntoid->elements, ntoid->length); output += ntoid->length;
+	memcpy(output, &name_len_be, sizeof(name_len_be)); output += sizeof(name_len_be);
+	memcpy(output, input_name, name_len);
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free storage associated with a buffer.  The storage must have been allocated
+ * by a GSS-API routine.  In addition to freeing the associated storage, the
+ * routine will zero the length field in the descriptor to which the buffer
+ * parameter refers, and implementations are encouraged to additionally set the
+ * pointer field in the descriptor to NULL.  Any buffer object returned by a
+ * GSS-API routine may be passed to gss_release_buffer (even if there is no
+ * storage associated with the buffer).
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_release_buffer(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_buffer_t buffer)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* deallocate the buffer associated with the buffer */
+	free(buffer->value);	
+	buffer->length = 0;
+	buffer->value = NULL;
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Allows an application to acquire a handle for a pre-existing credential by
+ * name.  GSS-API implementations must impose a local access-control policy on
+ * callers of this routine to prevent unauthorized callers from acquiring
+ * credentials to which they are not entitled.  This routine is not intended to
+ * provide a "login to the network" function, as such a function would involve
+ * the creation of new credentials rather than merely acquiring a handle to
+ * existing credentials.  Such functions, if required, should be defined in
+ * implementation-specific extensions to the API.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_acquire_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_name_t desired_name,
+	OM_uint32 time_req, gss_OID_set desired_mechs, gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage,
+	gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, gss_OID_set *actual_mechs, OM_uint32 *time_rec)
+{
+	OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	SYSTEMTIME current_time_system;
+	wchar_t * desired_name_utf16 = NULL;
+	CredHandle cred_handle, *p_cred_handle = NULL;
+	
+
+	if (output_cred_handle != NULL)
+		*output_cred_handle = NULL;
+
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0)
+		goto done;
+
+	/* get the current time so we can determine expiration if requested */
+	GetSystemTime(&current_time_system);
+
+	/* translate credential usage parameters */
+	ULONG cred_usage_local = 0;
+	if (cred_usage == GSS_C_ACCEPT) cred_usage_local = SECPKG_CRED_INBOUND;
+	else if (cred_usage == GSS_C_INITIATE) cred_usage_local = SECPKG_CRED_OUTBOUND;
+	else if (cred_usage == GSS_C_BOTH) cred_usage_local = SECPKG_CRED_BOTH;
+
+	/* convert input name to unicode so we can process usernames with special characters */
+	if ((desired_name_utf16 = utf8_to_utf16(desired_name)) == NULL)
+		goto done;
+
+	/* acquire a handle to existing credentials -- in many cases the name will
+	 * be null in which case the credentials of the current user are used */
+	TimeStamp expiry;
+	SECURITY_STATUS status = SecFunctions->AcquireCredentialsHandleW(desired_name_utf16, MICROSOFT_KERBEROS_NAME_W, cred_usage_local,
+		NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &cred_handle, &expiry);
+
+	/* fail immediately if errors occurred */
+	if (status != SEC_E_OK)
+		goto done;
+	
+	p_cred_handle = &cred_handle;
+	/* copy credential data out of local buffer */
+	if (output_cred_handle != NULL) {
+		if ((*output_cred_handle = malloc(sizeof(struct cred_st))) == NULL)
+			goto done;
+		(*output_cred_handle)->isToken = 0;
+		(*output_cred_handle)->credHandle = cred_handle;
+	}
+	
+	/* determine expiration if requested */
+	if (time_rec != NULL) {
+		FILETIME current_time;
+		if (SystemTimeToFileTime(&current_time_system, &current_time) != 0)
+			*time_rec = (OM_uint32)(expiry.QuadPart - ((PLARGE_INTEGER)&current_time)->QuadPart) / 10000;
+		else
+			error("SystemTimeToFileTime failed with %lu", GetLastError());
+	}
+
+	/* set actual supported mechs if requested */
+	if (actual_mechs != NULL && gss_indicate_mechs(minor_status, actual_mechs) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+		goto done;
+
+	ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+done:
+	if (desired_name_utf16)
+		free(desired_name_utf16);
+	if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		if (p_cred_handle)
+			SecFunctions->FreeCredentialsHandle(p_cred_handle);
+		if (output_cred_handle && *output_cred_handle) {
+			free(*output_cred_handle);
+			*output_cred_handle = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initiates the establishment of a security context between the application and
+ * a remote peer.  Initially, the input_token parameter should be specified
+ * either as GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, or as a pointer to a gss_buffer_desc object whose
+ * length field contains the value zero. The routine may return a output_token
+ * which should be transferred to the peer application, where the peer
+ * application will present it to gss_accept_sec_context.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_init_sec_context(
+	OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
+	gss_name_t target_name, gss_OID mech_type, OM_uint32 req_flags, OM_uint32 time_req, gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
+	gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_OID * actual_mech_type, gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
+	OM_uint32 * time_rec)
+{
+	OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	wchar_t * target_name_utf16 = NULL;
+	gss_ctx_id_t p_ctx_h = NULL;
+
+	output_token->value = NULL;
+
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		goto done;
+
+	/* make sure we support the passed type */
+	if (mech_type->length != GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE->length ||
+	    memcmp(mech_type->elements, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE->elements, mech_type->length) != 0) {
+		ret = GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	
+	unsigned long sspi_req_flags = ISC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY;
+	if (req_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) 
+		sspi_req_flags |= ISC_REQ_MUTUAL_AUTH;
+	if (req_flags & GSS_C_CONF_FLAG) 
+		sspi_req_flags |= ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY;
+	if (req_flags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) 
+		sspi_req_flags |= ISC_REQ_REPLAY_DETECT;
+	if (req_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) 
+		sspi_req_flags |= ISC_REQ_DELEGATE;
+	if (req_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) 
+		sspi_req_flags |= ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY;
+	if (req_flags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) 
+		sspi_req_flags |= ISC_REQ_SEQUENCE_DETECT;
+
+	/* determine if this is the first call (no input buffer available) */
+	gss_buffer_desc empty_buffer = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	const int no_input_buffer = (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) || memcmp(input_token, &empty_buffer, sizeof(gss_buffer_desc)) == 0;
+
+	/* setup input buffer */
+	SecBuffer input_buffer_token = { (no_input_buffer) ? 0 : (unsigned long) input_token->length, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, (no_input_buffer) ? NULL : input_token->value };
+	SecBufferDesc input_buffer = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, 1, &input_buffer_token };
+
+	/* setup output buffer - will be dynamically allocated by function */
+	SecBuffer output_buffer_token = { 0, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, NULL };
+	SecBufferDesc output_buffer = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, 1, &output_buffer_token };
+
+	/* get the current time so we can determine expiration if requested */
+	SYSTEMTIME current_time_system;
+	GetSystemTime(&current_time_system);
+
+	/* acquire default cred handler if none specified */
+	CredHandle *pCredHandle = NULL;
+	if (claimant_cred_handle != NULL)
+		pCredHandle = &(claimant_cred_handle->credHandle);
+	
+	if (pCredHandle == NULL) {
+		static CredHandle cred_handle = { 0, 0 };
+		pCredHandle = &cred_handle;
+		if (cred_handle.dwLower == 0 && cred_handle.dwUpper == 0) {
+			TimeStamp expiry_cred;
+			if (SecFunctions->AcquireCredentialsHandleW(NULL, MICROSOFT_KERBEROS_NAME_W, SECPKG_CRED_OUTBOUND,
+			    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &cred_handle, &expiry_cred) != SEC_E_OK)
+				goto done;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* condition the string for windows */
+	if ((target_name_utf16 = utf8_to_utf16(target_name)) == NULL)
+		goto done;
+
+	if (wcsncmp(target_name_utf16, L"host@", wcslen(L"host@")) == 0) 
+		*wcschr(target_name_utf16, L'@') = L'/';
+
+	TimeStamp expiry;
+	LONG sspi_ret_flags = 0;
+	CtxtHandle out_context;
+
+	const SECURITY_STATUS status = SecFunctions->InitializeSecurityContextW(pCredHandle,
+		(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ? NULL : *context_handle,
+		target_name_utf16, sspi_req_flags, 0, SECURITY_NATIVE_DREP, (no_input_buffer) ? NULL : &input_buffer,
+		0, (*context_handle != NULL) ? NULL : &out_context, &output_buffer, &sspi_ret_flags, (time_rec == NULL) ? NULL : &expiry);
+
+	/* check if error occurred */
+	if (status != SEC_E_OK && status != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
+		goto done;
+	
+	/* copy output token to output buffer */
+	output_token->length = output_buffer_token.cbBuffer;
+	if ((output_token->value = malloc(output_token->length)) == NULL)
+		goto done;
+
+	memcpy(output_token->value, output_buffer_token.pvBuffer, output_token->length);
+	SecFunctions->FreeContextBuffer(output_buffer_token.pvBuffer);
+
+	/* if requested, translate returned flags that are actually available */
+	if (ret_flags != NULL) {
+		*ret_flags = 0;
+		if (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_MUTUAL_AUTH) 
+			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG;
+		if (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY) 
+			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_CONF_FLAG;
+		if (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_REPLAY_DETECT) 
+			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG;
+		if (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_DELEGATE) 
+			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
+		if (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_INTEGRITY) 
+			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG;
+		if (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_SEQUENCE_DETECT) 
+			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG;
+	}
+
+	/* report if delegation was requested by not fulfilled */
+	if ((sspi_req_flags & ISC_REQ_DELEGATE) != 0 && (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_DELEGATE) == 0)
+		debug("sspi delegation was requested but not fulfilled");
+
+	/* if requested, translate the expiration time to number of second */
+	if (time_rec != NULL) {
+		FILETIME current_time;
+		if (SystemTimeToFileTime(&current_time_system, &current_time) != 0)
+			*time_rec = (OM_uint32)(expiry.QuadPart - ((PLARGE_INTEGER)&current_time)->QuadPart) / 10000;
+		else
+			error("SystemTimeToFileTime failed with %lu", GetLastError());
+	}
+
+	/* if requested, return the supported mechanism oid */
+	if (actual_mech_type != NULL)
+		*actual_mech_type = GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
+	
+	/* copy the credential context structure to the caller */
+	if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
+		if ((p_ctx_h = malloc(sizeof(out_context))) == NULL)
+			goto done;
+		*context_handle = p_ctx_h;
+		memcpy(*context_handle, &out_context, sizeof(out_context));
+	}
+
+	ret = (status == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ? GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+done:
+	if (target_name_utf16)
+		free(target_name_utf16);
+
+	if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE && ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+		if (output_token->value) {
+			free(output_token->value);
+			output_token->value = NULL;
+		}
+		if (p_ctx_h)
+			free(p_ctx_h);
+		
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Informs GSS-API that the specified credential handle is no longer required by
+ * the application, and frees associated resources. Implementations are
+ * encouraged to set the cred_handle to GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL on successful
+ * completion of this call.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_release_cred(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_cred_id_t * cred_handle)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	if (*cred_handle != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+		if ((*cred_handle)->isToken) {
+			CloseHandle((*cred_handle)->token);
+			if ((*cred_handle)->token == sspi_auth_user)
+				sspi_auth_user = 0;
+		}
+		else
+			SecFunctions->FreeCredentialsHandle(&(*cred_handle)->credHandle);
+		free(*cred_handle);
+		*cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+	}
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Delete a security context.  gss_delete_sec_context will delete the local data
+ * structures associated with the specified security context, and may generate
+ * an output_token, which when passed to the peer gss_process_context_token will
+ * instruct it to do likewise.  If no token is required by the mechanism, the
+ * GSS-API should set the length field of the output_token (if provided) to
+ * zero.  No further security services may be obtained using the context
+ * specified by context_handle.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, 
+	gss_buffer_t output_token)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* input sanity checks */
+	if (context_handle == NULL)
+		return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
+
+	if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
+		free(output_token->value);
+		output_token->value = NULL;
+		output_token->length = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* cleanup security context */
+	SecFunctions->DeleteSecurityContext(*context_handle);
+	free(*context_handle);
+	*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verifies that a cryptographic MIC, contained in the token parameter, fits the
+ * supplied message.  The qop_state parameter allows a message recipient to
+ * determine the strength of protection that was applied to the message.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_verify_mic(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
+	gss_buffer_t message_buffer, gss_buffer_t message_token, gss_qop_t * qop_state)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* translate the message and token to a security buffer so we can verify it */
+	SecBuffer verify_buffer_set[] = { 
+		{ (unsigned long) message_buffer->length, SECBUFFER_DATA, message_buffer->value },
+		{ (unsigned long) message_token->length, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, message_token->value } };
+	SecBufferDesc verify_buffer = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, _countof(verify_buffer_set), verify_buffer_set };
+
+	/* verify message and signature */
+	ULONG qop;
+	const SECURITY_STATUS status = SecFunctions->VerifySignature(context_handle, &verify_buffer, 0, &qop);
+
+	/* translate error codes */
+	OM_uint32 return_code = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+	if (status != SEC_E_OK) {
+		/* translate specific error */
+		if (status == SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED) return_code = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+		else if (status == SEC_E_OUT_OF_SEQUENCE) return_code = GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN;
+		else if (status == SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN) return_code = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+		else if (status == SEC_E_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) return_code = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+		else if (status == SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED) return_code = GSS_S_BAD_QOP;
+		else return_code = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	if (qop_state != NULL)
+		*qop_state = (OM_uint32) GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
+	
+	return return_code;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Generates a cryptographic MIC for the supplied message, and places the MIC in
+ * a token for transfer to the peer application. The qop_req parameter allows a
+ * choice between several cryptographic algorithms, if supported by the chosen
+ * mechanism.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_get_mic(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
+	gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_buffer_t message_buffer, gss_buffer_t message_token)
+{
+	OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	message_token->value = NULL;	
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0)
+		goto done;
+
+	/* determine the max possible signature and allocate memory to support it */
+	SecPkgContext_Sizes sizes;
+	if (SecFunctions->QueryContextAttributesW(context_handle, SECPKG_ATTR_SIZES, &sizes) != SEC_E_OK)
+		goto done;
+	if ((message_token->value = malloc(sizes.cbMaxSignature)) == NULL)
+		goto done;
+
+	message_token->length = sizes.cbMaxSignature;
+
+	/* translate the message and token to a security buffer so we can sign it */
+	SecBuffer sign_buffer_set[] = {
+		{ (unsigned long) message_buffer->length, SECBUFFER_DATA, message_buffer->value },
+		{ (unsigned long) message_token->length, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, message_token->value } };
+	SecBufferDesc sign_buffer = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, _countof(sign_buffer_set), sign_buffer_set };
+
+	/* attempt to sign the data */
+	ULONG qop = 0;
+	const SECURITY_STATUS status = SecFunctions->MakeSignature(context_handle, qop, &sign_buffer, 0);
+
+	/* translate error codes */
+	if (status != SEC_E_OK)  {
+		if (status == SEC_E_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) 
+			ret = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+		else if (status == SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED) 
+			ret = GSS_S_BAD_QOP;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+done:
+	if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		if (message_token->value) {
+			free(message_token->value);
+			message_token->value = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allows a remotely initiated security context between the application and a
+ * remote peer to be established.  The routine may return a output_token which
+ * should be transferred to the peer application, where the peer application
+ * will present it to gss_init_sec_context. If no token need be sent,
+ * gss_accept_sec_context will indicate this by setting the length field of the
+ * output_token argument to zero.  To complete the context establishment, one or
+ * more reply tokens may be required from the peer application; if so,
+ * gss_accept_sec_context will return a status flag of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, in
+ * which case it should be called again when the reply token is received from
+ * the peer application, passing the token to gss_accept_sec_context via the
+ * input_token parameters.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
+	gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle, gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
+	gss_name_t * src_name, gss_OID * mech_type, gss_buffer_t output_token,
+	OM_uint32 * ret_flags, OM_uint32 * time_rec, gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle)
+{
+	OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	gss_ctx_id_t p_ctx_h = NULL;
+
+	*src_name = NULL;
+
+	if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
+		*delegated_cred_handle = NULL;
+
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		goto done;
+
+	/* setup input buffer */
+	SecBuffer input_buffer_token = { (unsigned long) input_token_buffer->length, 
+		SECBUFFER_TOKEN | SECBUFFER_READONLY, input_token_buffer->value };
+	SecBufferDesc input_buffer = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, 1, &input_buffer_token };
+
+	/* setup output buffer - will be dynamically allocated by function */
+	SecBuffer output_buffer_token = { 0, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, NULL };
+	SecBufferDesc output_buffer = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, 1, &output_buffer_token };
+
+	/* get the current time so we can determine expiration if requested */
+	SYSTEMTIME current_time_system;
+	GetSystemTime(&current_time_system);
+
+	TimeStamp expiry;
+	CtxtHandle sspi_context_handle;
+	ULONG sspi_ret_flags = 0;
+	ULONG sspi_req_flags = ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY | ASC_REQ_MUTUAL_AUTH | ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY | 
+		ASC_REQ_DELEGATE | ASC_REQ_SEQUENCE_DETECT | ASC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY;
+
+	/* call sspi accept security context function */
+	const SECURITY_STATUS status = SecFunctions->AcceptSecurityContext(&acceptor_cred_handle->credHandle, 
+		(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ? NULL : *context_handle, &input_buffer,
+		sspi_req_flags, SECURITY_NATIVE_DREP, 
+		(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ? &sspi_context_handle : *context_handle, 
+		&output_buffer, &sspi_ret_flags, &expiry);
+
+	/* translate error codes */
+	if (status != SEC_E_OK && status != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+		if (status == SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN) 
+			ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+		else if (status == SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE) 
+			ret = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* only do checks on the finalized context (no continue needed) */
+	if (status == SEC_E_OK) {
+		/* validate accepted context is actually a host service ticket */
+		SecPkgContext_NativeNamesW target;
+		if (SecFunctions->QueryContextAttributesW((*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ? &sspi_context_handle : *context_handle,
+		    SECPKG_ATTR_NATIVE_NAMES, &target) != SEC_E_OK)
+			goto done;
+		
+		const int valid_spn = _wcsnicmp(target.sServerName, L"host/", wcslen(L"host/")) == 0;
+		FreeContextBuffer(target.sServerName);
+		FreeContextBuffer(target.sClientName);
+		if (valid_spn == 0) {
+			debug("client passed an invalid principal name");
+			ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* copy the context handler to the caller */
+	if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
+		if ((p_ctx_h = malloc(sizeof(CtxtHandle))) == NULL)
+			goto done;
+		*context_handle = p_ctx_h;
+		memcpy(*context_handle, &sspi_context_handle, sizeof(CtxtHandle));
+	}
+
+	/* if requested, translate returned flags that are actually available */
+	if (ret_flags != NULL) {
+		*ret_flags = 0;
+		if (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_MUTUAL_AUTH) 
+			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG;
+		if (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY) 
+			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_CONF_FLAG;
+		if (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_REPLAY_DETECT) 
+			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG;
+		if (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_DELEGATE) 
+			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
+		if (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_INTEGRITY) 
+			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG;
+		if (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_SEQUENCE_DETECT) 
+			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG;
+	}
+
+	/* report if delegation was requested by not fulfilled */
+	if ((sspi_req_flags & ASC_REQ_DELEGATE) != 0 && (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_DELEGATE) == 0)
+		debug("%s: delegation was requested but not fulfilled", __FUNCTION__);
+	
+	/* if provided, specify the mechanism */
+	if (mech_type != NULL)
+		*mech_type = GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
+	
+	/* if requested, translate the expiration time to number of second */
+	if (time_rec != NULL) {
+		FILETIME current_time;
+		if (SystemTimeToFileTime(&current_time_system, &current_time) != 0)
+			*time_rec = (OM_uint32)(expiry.QuadPart - ((PLARGE_INTEGER)&current_time)->QuadPart) / 10000;
+		else
+			error("SystemTimeToFileTime failed with %lu", GetLastError());
+	}
+
+	/* only do checks on the finalized context (no continue needed) */
+	if (status == SEC_E_OK) {
+		/* extract the username from the context handle will be domain\samaccountname format */
+		SecPkgContext_NamesW NamesBuffer;
+		if (SecFunctions->QueryContextAttributesW(*context_handle, SECPKG_ATTR_NAMES, &NamesBuffer) != SEC_E_OK)
+			goto done;
+		
+		/* copy to internal utf8 string and free the sspi string */
+		if ((*src_name = utf16_to_utf8(NamesBuffer.sUserName)) == NULL)
+			goto done;
+
+		FreeContextBuffer(NamesBuffer.sUserName);
+	}
+
+	/* copy output token to output buffer */
+	output_token->length = output_buffer_token.cbBuffer;
+	output_token->value = malloc(output_token->length);
+	memcpy(output_token->value, output_buffer_token.pvBuffer, output_token->length);
+	SecFunctions->FreeContextBuffer(output_buffer_token.pvBuffer);
+
+	/* get the user token for impersonation */
+	if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL) {
+		if ((*delegated_cred_handle = malloc(sizeof(struct cred_st))) == NULL)
+			goto done;
+		if (SecFunctions->QuerySecurityContextToken(*context_handle, &sspi_auth_user) != SEC_E_OK)
+			goto done;
+		(*delegated_cred_handle)->isToken = 1;
+		(*delegated_cred_handle)->token = sspi_auth_user;
+	}
+
+	ret = (status == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ? GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+done:
+	if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE && ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+		if (p_ctx_h)
+			free(p_ctx_h);
+		if (*src_name)
+			free(*src_name);
+		if (delegated_cred_handle && *delegated_cred_handle)
+			free(*delegated_cred_handle);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of an opaque
+ * internal-form name for display purposes.  The syntax of a printable name is
+ * defined by the GSS-API implementation.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_display_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_name_t input_name, 
+	gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, gss_OID * output_name_type)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	output_name_buffer->length = strlen(input_name) + 1;
+	if ((output_name_buffer->value = _strdup(input_name)) == NULL)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* set the output oid type if requested */
+	if (output_name_type != NULL)
+		*output_name_type = GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
+	
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of a GSS-API status
+ * code, for display to the user or for logging purposes.  Since some status
+ * values may indicate multiple conditions, applications may need to call
+ * gss_display_status multiple times, each call generating a single text string.
+ * The message_context parameter is used by gss_display_status to store state
+ * information about which error messages have already been extracted from a
+ * given status_value; message_context must be initialized to 0 by the
+ * application prior to the first call, and gss_display_status will return a
+ * non-zero value in this parameter if there are further messages to extract.
+ */
+OM_uint32 
+gss_display_status(OM_uint32 * minor_status, OM_uint32 status_value, int status_type,
+	gss_OID mech_type, OM_uint32 * message_context, gss_buffer_t status_string)
+{
+	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* lookup textual representation of the numeric status code */
+	char * message_string = NULL;
+	if (status_value == GSS_S_COMPLETE) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_COMPLETE";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_MECH) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_MECH";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_NAME) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_NAME";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_QOP) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_QOP";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_SIG) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_SIG";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_STATUS) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_STATUS";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_FAILURE) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_FAILURE";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_NO_CRED) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_NO_CRED";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE";
+	else if (status_value == GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN) 
+		message_string = "GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN";
+
+	/* copy local status string to the output buffer */
+	status_string->length = strlen(message_string) + 1;
+	if ((status_string->value = _strdup(message_string)) == NULL)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* no supplementary messages available */
+	*message_context = 0;
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The function ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok and gssapi_kerberos_mech structure
+ * are referenced in gss-serv.c and are required in order for the calling
+ * code to accept negotiate a kerberos token.
+ */
+
+static int 
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+{
+	/*
+	 * This check is important since it makes sure that the username string
+	 * that the user passed (e.g. user@host) matches the user authenticated
+	 * via SSPI.  If this check fails, the authentication process will move
+	 * onto the next available method.
+	 */
+	struct passwd * user = getpwnam(name);
+	if (user == NULL)
+	{
+		error("sspi getpwnam failed to get user from user-provided, resolved user '%s'", name);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (_stricmp(client->displayname.value, user->pw_name) != 0) {
+		/* check failed */
+		debug("sspi user '%s' did not match user-provided, resolved user '%s'", 
+			(char *) client->displayname.value, name);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+	"toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+	"Kerberos",
+	{sizeof(GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_STR) - 1, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_STR},
+	NULL,
+	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+};
+
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
\ No newline at end of file

gss-serv.c

@@ -57,12 +57,12 @@ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
 
-#ifdef KRB5
+#if defined(KRB5) || defined (SSPI)
 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
 #endif
 
 ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= {
-#ifdef KRB5
+#if defined(KRB5) || defined (SSPI)
 	&gssapi_kerberos_mech,
 #endif
 	&gssapi_null_mech,

includes.h

@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@
 
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/opensslv.h> /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+#include "libcrypto-compat.h"
 #endif
 
 #include "defines.h"

kexdhc.c

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
 	int r;
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
 
 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
 	switch (kex->kex_type) {
@@ -81,21 +82,27 @@ kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 		goto out;
 	}
 	debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
-	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||
+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
 	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 #endif
 	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY");
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, &input_kex_dh);
 	r = 0;
  out:
+	if (r != 0) {
+		DH_free(kex->dh);
+		kex->dh = NULL;
+	}
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -110,6 +117,7 @@ input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
 	size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
 	int kout, r;
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
 
 	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -169,6 +177,7 @@ input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 #endif
 
 	/* calc and verify H */
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
 	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
 	if ((r = kex_dh_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
@@ -177,7 +186,7 @@ input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
 	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
-	    kex->dh->pub_key,
+	    pub_key,
 	    dh_server_pub,
 	    shared_secret,
 	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)

kexdhs.c

@@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ kexdh_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, &input_kex_dh_init);
 	r = 0;
  out:
+	if (r != 0) {
+		DH_free(kex->dh);
+		kex->dh = NULL;
+	}
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -102,6 +106,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	size_t sbloblen, slen;
 	size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
 	int kout, r;
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
 
 	if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
 	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
@@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		goto out;
 	/* calc H */
 	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
 	if ((r = kex_dh_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
 	    kex->client_version_string,
@@ -172,7 +178,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
 	    dh_client_pub,
-	    kex->dh->pub_key,
+	    pub_key,
 	    shared_secret,
 	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -198,7 +204,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||	/* f */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||	/* f */
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 		goto out;

kexgexc.c

@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
 	BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
 	int r, bits;
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
 
 	debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
 
@@ -119,26 +120,30 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
 
 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||
+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
 	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 #endif
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, NULL);
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &input_kex_dh_gex_reply);
 	r = 0;
 out:
-	if (p)
-		BN_clear_free(p);
-	if (g)
-		BN_clear_free(g);
+	BN_clear_free(p);
+	BN_clear_free(g);
+	if (r != 0) {
+		DH_free(kex->dh);
+		kex->dh = NULL;
+	}
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -153,6 +158,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
 	size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
 	int kout, r;
+	const BIGNUM *p, *g, *pub_key;
 
 	debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
 	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
@@ -219,6 +225,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		kex->min = kex->max = -1;
 
 	/* calc and verify H */
+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, NULL, &g);
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
 	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
 	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
@@ -228,8 +236,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
 	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
-	    kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g,
-	    kex->dh->pub_key,
+	    p, g,
+	    pub_key,
 	    dh_server_pub,
 	    shared_secret,
 	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)

kexgexs.c

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
 	int r;
 	u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0;
+	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
 
 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 ||
@@ -102,9 +103,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		goto out;
 	}
 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent");
+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, NULL, &g);
 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->p)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->g)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, g)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -116,6 +118,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init);
 	r = 0;
  out:
+	if (r != 0) {
+		DH_free(kex->dh);
+		kex->dh = NULL;
+	}
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -131,6 +137,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	size_t sbloblen, slen;
 	size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
 	int kout, r;
+	const BIGNUM *p, *g, *pub_key;
 
 	if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
 	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
@@ -193,6 +200,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		goto out;
 	/* calc H */
 	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, NULL, &g);
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
 	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
 	    kex->client_version_string,
@@ -201,9 +210,9 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
 	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
-	    kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g,
+	    p, g,
 	    dh_client_pub,
-	    kex->dh->pub_key,
+	    pub_key,
 	    shared_secret,
 	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -229,7 +238,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||     /* f */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||     /* f */
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 		goto out;

libcrypto-compat.c

+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+static void *OPENSSL_zalloc(size_t num)
+{
+    void *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        memset(ret, 0, num);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
+{
+    /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e.  d may be
+     * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
+     */
+    if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
+        || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (n != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->n);
+        r->n = n;
+    }
+    if (e != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->e);
+        r->e = e;
+    }
+    if (d != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->d);
+        r->d = d;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
+{
+    /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->p);
+        r->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->q);
+        r->q = q;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
+{
+    /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
+        || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
+        || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->dmp1);
+        r->dmp1 = dmp1;
+    }
+    if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->dmq1);
+        r->dmq1 = dmq1;
+    }
+    if (iqmp != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->iqmp);
+        r->iqmp = iqmp;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+                  const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
+{
+    if (n != NULL)
+        *n = r->n;
+    if (e != NULL)
+        *e = r->e;
+    if (d != NULL)
+        *d = r->d;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
+{
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p = r->p;
+    if (q != NULL)
+        *q = r->q;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
+                         const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+                         const BIGNUM **iqmp)
+{
+    if (dmp1 != NULL)
+        *dmp1 = r->dmp1;
+    if (dmq1 != NULL)
+        *dmq1 = r->dmq1;
+    if (iqmp != NULL)
+        *iqmp = r->iqmp;
+}
+
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d,
+                  const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
+{
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p = d->p;
+    if (q != NULL)
+        *q = d->q;
+    if (g != NULL)
+        *g = d->g;
+}
+
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+    /* If the fields p, q and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL)
+        || (d->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->p);
+        d->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->q);
+        d->q = q;
+    }
+    if (g != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->g);
+        d->g = g;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d,
+                  const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+    if (pub_key != NULL)
+        *pub_key = d->pub_key;
+    if (priv_key != NULL)
+        *priv_key = d->priv_key;
+}
+
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+    /* If the field pub_key in d is NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.  The priv_key field may
+     * be left NULL.
+     */
+    if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (pub_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->pub_key);
+        d->pub_key = pub_key;
+    }
+    if (priv_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->priv_key);
+        d->priv_key = priv_key;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+    if (pr != NULL)
+        *pr = sig->r;
+    if (ps != NULL)
+        *ps = sig->s;
+}
+
+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+    if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+    BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+    sig->r = r;
+    sig->s = s;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+    if (pr != NULL)
+        *pr = sig->r;
+    if (ps != NULL)
+        *ps = sig->s;
+}
+
+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+    if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+    BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+    sig->r = r;
+    sig->s = s;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh,
+                 const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
+{
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p = dh->p;
+    if (q != NULL)
+        *q = dh->q;
+    if (g != NULL)
+        *g = dh->g;
+}
+
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+    /* If the fields p and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.  q may remain NULL.
+     */
+    if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->p);
+        dh->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->q);
+        dh->q = q;
+    }
+    if (g != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->g);
+        dh->g = g;
+    }
+
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        dh->length = BN_num_bits(q);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+    if (pub_key != NULL)
+        *pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+    if (priv_key != NULL)
+        *priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+}
+
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+    /* If the field pub_key in dh is NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.  The priv_key field may
+     * be left NULL.
+     */
+    if (dh->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (pub_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->pub_key);
+        dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+    }
+    if (priv_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(dh->priv_key);
+        dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length)
+{
+    dh->length = length;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->iv;
+}
+
+unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->iv;
+}
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
+}
+
+static void OPENSSL_clear_free(void *str, size_t num)
+{
+    if (str == NULL)
+        return;
+    if (num)
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(str, num);
+    OPENSSL_free(str);
+}
+
+/* This call frees resources associated with the context */
+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Don't assume ctx->md_data was cleaned in EVP_Digest_Final, because
+     * sometimes only copies of the context are ever finalised.
+     */
+    if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->cleanup
+        && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED))
+        ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx);
+    if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size && ctx->md_data
+        && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE)) {
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size);
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx->pctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine);
+#endif
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    RSA_METHOD *ret;
+
+    ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_METHOD));
+
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        memcpy(ret, meth, sizeof(*meth));
+        ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(meth->name);
+        if (ret->name == NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(ret);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name)
+{
+    char *tmpname;
+
+    tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+    if (tmpname == NULL) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free((char *)meth->name);
+    meth->name = tmpname;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                          int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                           unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                           int padding))
+{
+    meth->rsa_priv_enc = priv_enc;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                          int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                           unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                           int padding))
+{
+    meth->rsa_priv_dec = priv_dec;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa))
+{
+    meth->finish = finish;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    if (meth != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free((char *)meth->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(meth);
+    }
+}
+
+int RSA_bits(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return (BN_num_bits(r->n));
+}
+
+int DSA_bits(const DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return BN_num_bits(dsa->p);
+}
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return pkey->pkey.rsa;
+}
+
+EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(int cipher_type, int block_size, int key_len)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER *cipher = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+    if (cipher != NULL) {
+        cipher->nid = cipher_type;
+        cipher->block_size = block_size;
+        cipher->key_len = key_len;
+    }
+    return cipher;
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(cipher);
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iv_len)
+{
+    cipher->iv_len = iv_len;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    cipher->flags = flags;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                          const unsigned char *key,
+                                          const unsigned char *iv,
+                                          int enc))
+{
+    cipher->init = init;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                  int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                    unsigned char *out,
+                                                    const unsigned char *in,
+                                                    size_t inl))
+{
+    cipher->do_cipher = do_cipher;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *))
+{
+    cipher->cleanup = cleanup;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type,
+                                          int arg, void *ptr))
+{
+    cipher->ctrl = ctrl;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          const unsigned char *key,
+                                                          const unsigned char *iv,
+                                                          int enc)
+{
+    return cipher->init;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                               unsigned char *out,
+                                                               const unsigned char *in,
+                                                               size_t inl)
+{
+    return cipher->do_cipher;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
+{
+    return cipher->cleanup;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                          int type, int arg,
+                                                          void *ptr)
+{
+    return cipher->ctrl;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->encrypt;
+}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */

libcrypto-compat.h

+#ifndef LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H
+#define LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d);
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp);
+
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+
+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length);
+
+const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void);
+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+#define EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(e) e->ctx_size
+#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx) ctx->cipher_data
+
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name);
+#define RSA_meth_get_finish(meth) meth->finish
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
+int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa));
+void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth);
+
+int RSA_bits(const RSA *r);
+int DSA_bits(const DSA *d);
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(int cipher_type, int block_size, int key_len);
+void EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iv_len);
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned long flags);
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                          const unsigned char *key,
+                                          const unsigned char *iv,
+                                          int enc));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                  int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                    unsigned char *out,
+                                                    const unsigned char *in,
+                                                    size_t inl));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type,
+                                          int arg, void *ptr));
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          const unsigned char *key,
+                                                          const unsigned char *iv,
+                                                          int enc);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                               unsigned char *out,
+                                                               const unsigned char *in,
+                                                               size_t inl);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                          int type, int arg,
+                                                          void *ptr);
+
+#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(c)      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(c)
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+#endif /* LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H */
+
+#ifndef LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H
+#define LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d);
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp);
+
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+
+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length);
+
+const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void);
+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+#define EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(e) e->ctx_size
+#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx) ctx->cipher_data
+
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name);
+#define RSA_meth_get_finish(meth) meth->finish
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
+int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa));
+void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth);
+
+int RSA_bits(const RSA *r);
+int DSA_bits(const DSA *d);
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(int cipher_type, int block_size, int key_len);
+void EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iv_len);
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned long flags);
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                          const unsigned char *key,
+                                          const unsigned char *iv,
+                                          int enc));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                  int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                    unsigned char *out,
+                                                    const unsigned char *in,
+                                                    size_t inl));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type,
+                                          int arg, void *ptr));
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          const unsigned char *key,
+                                                          const unsigned char *iv,
+                                                          int enc);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                               unsigned char *out,
+                                                               const unsigned char *in,
+                                                               size_t inl);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                          int type, int arg,
+                                                          void *ptr);
+
+#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(c)      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(c)
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+#endif /* LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H */
+
+#ifndef LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H
+#define LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d);
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp);
+
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+
+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length);
+
+const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void);
+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+#define EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(e) e->ctx_size
+#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx) ctx->cipher_data
+
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name);
+#define RSA_meth_get_finish(meth) meth->finish
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
+int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa));
+void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth);
+
+int RSA_bits(const RSA *r);
+int DSA_bits(const DSA *d);
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(int cipher_type, int block_size, int key_len);
+void EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iv_len);
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned long flags);
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                          const unsigned char *key,
+                                          const unsigned char *iv,
+                                          int enc));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                  int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                    unsigned char *out,
+                                                    const unsigned char *in,
+                                                    size_t inl));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type,
+                                          int arg, void *ptr));
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          const unsigned char *key,
+                                                          const unsigned char *iv,
+                                                          int enc);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                                               unsigned char *out,
+                                                               const unsigned char *in,
+                                                               size_t inl);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+                                                          int type, int arg,
+                                                          void *ptr);
+
+#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(c)      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(c)
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+#endif /* LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H */
+

monitor.c

@@ -581,9 +581,12 @@ mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
 		return (0);
 	} else {
 		/* Send first bignum */
+		const BIGNUM *p, *g;
+
+		DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
 		buffer_put_char(m, 1);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(m, g);
 
 		DH_free(dh);
 	}

openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c

@@ -70,12 +70,19 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
 void
 ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
 
 	/* Enable use of crypto hardware */
 	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10001000L
 	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+#endif
 	OPENSSL_config(NULL);
+#else
+	OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS |
+	    OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL);
+#endif
 }
 #endif
 

patches/0002-cygwin-252-nxclient-w32-nxcomp.patch

+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 7470dfc..1f0934b 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh])
+ AC_SUBST(NXCOMPINC)
+ AC_SUBST(NXCOMPLIBS)
+ 
+-NXCOMPINC="-I$includedir/nx"
+-NXCOMPLIBS="-lXcomp"
++NXCOMPINC="-I../nxcomp"
++NXCOMPLIBS="-L../nxcomp -lXcomp -lstdc++ -lpng -ljpeg -lz"
+ 
+ dnl select manpage formatter
+ if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
+@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ case "$host" in
+ *-*-cygwin*)
+ 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ 	dont_check_for_resolv=1
+-	LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textmode.o /usr/lib/libminires.a"
++	LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textmode.o"
+ 	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],

patches/0003-cygwin-252-nxclient-w32-sspi.patch

+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index e149e74..59db511 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -98,7 +98,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ 	platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o libcrypto-compat.o
+ 
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+-	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o proxy.o
++	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o proxy.o \
++	gss-serv-sspi.o
+ 
+ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
+ 	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
+@@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
+ 	auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+ 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+ 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+-	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o gss-serv-sspi.o \
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 1f0934b..5961157 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -4182,11 +4182,28 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
+ 
++# Check whether user wants SSPI support
++SSPI_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH([sspi],
++	[  --with-sspi             Enable GSSAPI SSPI support],
++	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++		AC_DEFINE([SSPI], [1], [Define if you want SSPI support])
++		AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1],
++			[Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol])
++		AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI_SSPI], [1], [Define if you want GSSAPI SSPI support])
++		GSSLIBS="-lsecur32 -lws2_32"
++		SSPI_MSG="yes"
++	fi ]
++)
++
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ 	[  --with-kerberos5=PATH   Enable Kerberos 5 support],
+ 	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++		if test "x$SSPI_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
++			AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-sspi and --with-kerberos5 together, use one only])
++		fi
+ 		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ 			KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
+ 		else
+@@ -5104,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                    Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
+ echo "                       PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
+ echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
+ echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
++echo "                      SSPI support: $SSPI_MSG"
+ echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+ echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
+ echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
+diff --git a/contrib/win32/win32compat/debug.h b/contrib/win32/win32compat/debug.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9966ad5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/contrib/win32/win32compat/debug.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
++#pragma once
++// #ifndef __attribute__
++// #define __attribute__(A)
++// #endif
++
++#include "../../../log.h"
++#include "../../../ssherr.h"
++/* Enable the following for verbose logging */
++#if (0)
++#define debug4 debug2
++#define debug5 debug3
++#else
++#define debug4(a,...)
++#define debug5(a,...)
++#endif
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/contrib/win32/win32compat/inc/gssapi.h b/contrib/win32/win32compat/inc/gssapi.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e4c99ef
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/contrib/win32/win32compat/inc/gssapi.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
++/*
++ * Author: Bryan Berns <berns@uwalumni.com>
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
++ *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
++ *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
++ *    and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO
++ * EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
++ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
++ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
++ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
++ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
++ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#pragma once
++
++ /*
++  * This file provides the GSSAPI interface to support Kerberos SSPI within
++  * OpenSSH.  This is only a partial definition of the full GSSAPI specification
++  * since OpenSSH only requires a subset of the overall functionality.
++  *
++  * The definitions are derived from information provided in RFC2744.  In
++  * addition, RFC2743 provides additional information on the GSSAPI
++  * specification and intended operation.
++  */
++
++#include <windows.h>
++#include <stdint.h>
++
++#define SECURITY_WIN32
++#include <security.h>
++
++/*
++ * Common Structures & Type Definitions
++ */
++
++typedef uint32_t OM_uint32;
++
++typedef char *gss_name_struct, *gss_name_t;
++
++typedef struct cred_st *gss_cred_id_t;
++typedef CtxtHandle *gss_ctx_id_t;
++
++typedef OM_uint32 gss_qop_t;
++typedef OM_uint32 gss_cred_usage_t;
++
++typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct
++{
++	size_t length;
++	void *value;
++}
++gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t;
++
++typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct
++{
++	OM_uint32 length;
++	void *elements;
++}
++gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID;
++
++typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct
++{
++	size_t  count;
++	gss_OID elements;
++}
++gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set;
++
++typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct 
++{
++	OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype;
++	gss_buffer_desc initiator_address;
++	OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype;
++	gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address;
++	gss_buffer_desc application_data;
++} 
++gss_channel_bindings_desc, *gss_channel_bindings_t;
++
++/*
++ * Input & Return Flags 
++ */
++
++/* Credential Usage Indication Options */
++#define GSS_C_BOTH      0
++#define GSS_C_INITIATE  1
++#define GSS_C_ACCEPT    2
++
++/* Context Flag Options */
++#define GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG        1
++#define GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG       2
++#define GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG       4
++#define GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG     8
++#define GSS_C_CONF_FLAG         16
++#define GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG        32
++#define GSS_C_ANON_FLAG         64
++#define GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG   128
++#define GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG        256
++#define GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG 32768
++
++/* Display Status Code Types */
++#define GSS_C_GSS_CODE  1
++#define GSS_C_MECH_CODE 2
++
++/* Convenience Null Castless Comparison Options */
++#define GSS_C_NO_NAME             ((gss_name_t) 0)
++#define GSS_C_NO_BUFFER           ((gss_buffer_t) 0)
++#define GSS_C_NO_OID              ((gss_OID) 0)
++#define GSS_C_NO_OID_SET          ((gss_OID_set) 0)
++#define GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT          ((gss_ctx_id_t) 0)
++#define GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL       ((gss_cred_id_t) 0)
++#define GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ((gss_channel_bindings_t) 0)
++
++/* Convenience Initializer For Empty Buffer */
++#define GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER {0, NULL}
++
++/* Default Quality of Protection Code */
++#define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0
++
++ /* Infinite Context / Credential Value */
++#define GSS_C_INDEFINITE ((OM_uint32) 0xfffffffful)
++
++/*
++ * Status & Return Code Processing
++ */
++
++#define GSS_S_COMPLETE 0
++
++#define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET 24
++#define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET 16
++#define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET 0
++#define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK ((OM_uint32) 0377ul)
++#define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK ((OM_uint32) 0377ul)
++
++#define GSS_CALLING_ERROR(x)      ((x) & (GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET))
++#define GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(x)      ((x) & (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET))
++#define GSS_ERROR(x)              ((x) & ((GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) | (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)))
++
++#define GSS_S_BAD_MECH             (((OM_uint32)  1ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_BAD_NAME             (((OM_uint32)  2ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE         (((OM_uint32)  3ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS         (((OM_uint32)  4ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_BAD_STATUS           (((OM_uint32)  5ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_BAD_SIG              (((OM_uint32)  6ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_NO_CRED              (((OM_uint32)  7ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT           (((OM_uint32)  8ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN      (((OM_uint32)  9ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL (((OM_uint32) 10ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED  (((OM_uint32) 11ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED      (((OM_uint32) 12ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_FAILURE              (((OM_uint32) 13ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_BAD_QOP              (((OM_uint32) 14ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED         (((OM_uint32) 15ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE          (((OM_uint32) 16ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT    (((OM_uint32) 17ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++#define GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN          (((OM_uint32) 18ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
++
++#define GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED      (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 0))
++#define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN      (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 1))
++#define GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN            (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 2))
++#define GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN          (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 3))
++#define GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN            (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 4))
++
++/* 
++ * Function Prototypes 
++ */
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
++	gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle, gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, 
++	gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, gss_name_t * src_name, 
++	gss_OID * mech_type, gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 * ret_flags, 
++	OM_uint32 * time_rec, gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle);
++
++OM_uint32
++gss_acquire_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_name_t desired_name, 
++	OM_uint32 time_req, gss_OID_set desired_mechs, gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage,
++	gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, gss_OID_set *actual_mechs, 
++	OM_uint32 *time_rec);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_add_oid_set_member(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID member_oid, 
++	gss_OID_set * oid_set);
++
++OM_uint32
++gss_create_empty_oid_set(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * oid_set);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_init_sec_context(
++	OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
++	gss_name_t target_name, gss_OID mech_type, OM_uint32 req_flags, OM_uint32 time_req, gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
++	gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_OID * actual_mech_type, gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
++	OM_uint32 * time_rec);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
++	gss_buffer_t output_token);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_display_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_name_t input_name, 
++	gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, gss_OID * output_name_type);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_display_status(OM_uint32 * minor_status, OM_uint32 status_value,
++	int status_type, gss_OID mech_type, OM_uint32 * message_context, 
++	gss_buffer_t status_string);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_export_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, const gss_name_t input_name, 
++	gss_buffer_t exported_name);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_get_mic(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, 
++	gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_buffer_t message_buffer, 
++	gss_buffer_t message_token);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_import_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer,
++	gss_OID input_name_type, gss_name_t * output_name);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_indicate_mechs(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * mech_set);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_release_buffer(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_buffer_t buffer);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_release_cred(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_cred_id_t * cred_handle);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_release_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_name_t * input_name);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_release_oid_set(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * set);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_test_oid_set_member(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID member, 
++	gss_OID_set set, int * present);
++
++OM_uint32 
++gss_verify_mic(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, 
++	gss_buffer_t message_buffer, gss_buffer_t message_token, 
++	gss_qop_t * qop_state);
++
++extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/gss-serv-sspi.c b/gss-serv-sspi.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..bdd67cb
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/gss-serv-sspi.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,1155 @@
++/*
++ * Author: Bryan Berns <berns@uwalumni.com>
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
++ *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
++ *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
++ *    and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO
++ * EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
++ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
++ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
++ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
++ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
++ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "config.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#ifdef SSPI
++
++#define WIN32
++
++#define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++#define _countof(array) (sizeof(array) / sizeof(array[0]))
++#define _strdup strdup
++
++#define _stricmp strcasecmp
++#define _wcsnicmp wcsncasecmp
++
++#include <windows.h>
++#include <winsock2.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <wchar.h>
++#include <time.h>
++#include <pwd.h>
++
++#include "contrib/win32/win32compat/debug.h"
++#include "contrib/win32/win32compat/inc/gssapi.h"
++
++ /*
++  * This file provides the GSSAPI interface to support Kerberos SSPI within
++  * OpenSSH.  This is only a partial definition of the full GSSAPI specification
++  * since OpenSSH only requires a subset of the overall functionality.
++  *
++  * The function definitions as well as the accompanying comments are derived
++  * from information provided in RFC2744.  In addition, RFC2743 provides
++  * additional information on the GSSAPI specification and intended operation.
++  */
++
++/* 
++ * Include the definitions necessary to implement some of the interface
++ * structure that are required for gss-serv.c to perform Kerberos operations.
++ */
++#include "buffer.h"
++#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
++#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
++#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
++#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++
++/*on error returns NULL and sets errno*/
++static wchar_t *
++utf8_to_utf16(const char *utf8)
++{
++	int needed = 0;
++	wchar_t* utf16 = NULL;
++	if ((needed = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, utf8, -1, NULL, 0)) == 0 ||
++	    (utf16 = malloc(needed * sizeof(wchar_t))) == NULL ||
++	    MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, utf8, -1, utf16, needed) == 0) {
++		errno = ENOMEM;
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
++	return utf16;
++}
++
++static char *
++utf16_to_utf8(const wchar_t* utf16)
++{
++	int needed = 0;
++	char* utf8 = NULL;
++	if ((needed = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, utf16, -1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) == 0 ||
++	    (utf8 = malloc(needed)) == NULL ||
++	    WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, utf16, -1, utf8, needed, NULL, NULL) == 0)
++		return NULL;
++	
++	return utf8;
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be initialized to a function table that contains pointers to 
++ * all standard security functions.  The reason for using this instead of
++ * relying on the standard imports is because the OneCore libraries do
++ * not expose all the functions we need.
++ */
++PSecurityFunctionTableW SecFunctions = NULL;
++
++/*
++ * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE is a oid value that is used to negotiate a 
++ * a Kerberos transaction using an SPN in the format host@user@realm format. 
++ */
++#define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_STR "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"
++gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE = &(gss_OID_desc)
++{ 
++	sizeof(GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_STR) - 1,
++	(void *) GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_STR 
++};
++
++/* 
++ * This handle is used to relay the handle for the user to functions that 
++ * ultimately call CreateProcessAsUser to spawn the user shell.
++ */
++HANDLE sspi_auth_user = 0;
++
++struct cred_st {
++	int isToken;
++	union { 
++		HANDLE token;
++		CredHandle credHandle;
++	};
++};
++
++/*
++ * This is called before each gssapi implementation function to ensure the
++ * environment is initialized properly.  Any additional implementation setup
++ * should be added to this function.
++ */
++static int 
++ssh_gss_sspi_init(OM_uint32 * minor_status)
++{	
++	/* minor status never used - reset to zero*/
++	*minor_status = 0;
++
++	/* already initialized; return */
++	if (SecFunctions != NULL) 
++		return 1;
++
++	/* get a pointer to a function table containing all the function pointers */
++	if ((SecFunctions = InitSecurityInterfaceW()) == NULL) {
++		/* failure */
++		debug("failed to acquire function table for sspi support.");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	/* success */
++	return 1;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Allows an application to determine which underlying security mechanisms are
++ * available.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_indicate_mechs(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set *mech_set)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* create an list that contains the one oid that we support */
++	if (gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, mech_set) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++	
++	if (gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, mech_set) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		gss_release_oid_set(minor_status, mech_set);
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++	}
++
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Create an object-identifier set containing no object identifiers, to which
++ * members may be subsequently added using the gss_add_oid_set_member() routine.
++ * These routines are intended to be used to construct sets of mechanism object
++ * identifiers, for input to gss_acquire_cred.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_create_empty_oid_set(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * oid_set)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* allocate / initialize space for this new oid set */
++	if (((*oid_set) = calloc(1, sizeof(gss_OID_set_desc))) == NULL)
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Free storage associated with a GSSAPI-generated gss_OID_set object. The set
++ * parameter must refer to an OID-set that was returned from a GSS-API routine.
++ * gss_release_oid_set() will free the storage associated with each individual
++ * member OID, the OID set's elements array, and the gss_OID_set_desc.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_release_oid_set(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * set)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* free all individual oid strings */
++	for (size_t oid_num = 0; oid_num < (*set)->count; oid_num++)
++		free((*set)->elements[oid_num].elements);
++
++	/* free overall oid set */
++	free((*set)->elements);
++	free(*set);
++
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Add an Object Identifier to an Object Identifier set.  This routine is
++ * intended for use in conjunction with gss_create_empty_oid_set when
++ * constructing a set of mechanism OIDs for input to gss_acquire_cred. The
++ * oid_set parameter must refer to an OID-set that was created by GSS-API (e.g.
++ * a set returned by gss_create_empty_oid_set()). GSS-API creates a copy of the
++ * member_oid and inserts this copy into the set, expanding the storage
++ * allocated to the OID-set's elements array if necessary.  The routine may add
++ * the new member OID anywhere within the elements array, and implementations
++ * should verify that the new member_oid is not already contained within the
++ * elements array; if the member_oid is already present, the oid_set should
++ * remain unchanged.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_add_oid_set_member(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID member_oid, gss_OID_set * oid_set)
++{
++	OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
++	void * member_oid_elements = NULL;
++
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* create our own copy of the oid entry itself to add to the set */
++	if ((member_oid_elements = malloc(member_oid->length)) == NULL)
++		goto cleanup;
++	memcpy(member_oid_elements, member_oid->elements, member_oid->length);
++
++	/* reallocate the new elements structure based on the increased size */
++	const size_t current_count = (*oid_set)->count;
++	(*oid_set)->elements = realloc((*oid_set)->elements, (current_count + 1) * sizeof(gss_OID_desc));
++	if ((*oid_set)->elements == NULL)
++		goto cleanup;
++	
++	/* append the new oid to the end of the recently increased list */
++	(*oid_set)->elements[current_count].elements = member_oid_elements;
++	(*oid_set)->elements[current_count].length = member_oid->length;
++	(*oid_set)->count++;
++
++	member_oid_elements = NULL;
++	ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++cleanup:
++	if (member_oid_elements)
++		free(member_oid_elements);
++
++	return ret;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Interrogate an Object Identifier set to determine whether a specified Object
++ * Identifier is a member.  This routine is intended to be used with OID sets
++ * returned by gss_indicate_mechs(), gss_acquire_cred(), and gss_inquire_cred(),
++ * but will also work with user-generated sets.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_test_oid_set_member(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID member,
++	gss_OID_set set, int * present)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* loop through each oid in the passed set */
++	for (size_t oid_num = 0; oid_num < set->count; oid_num++) {
++		/* do not bother doing memory comparison if sizes do not match */
++		if (set->elements[oid_num].length != member->length) 
++			continue;
++
++		/* compare the binary storage of the test oid to the one in our list */
++		if (memcmp(set->elements[oid_num].elements, member->elements, member->length) == 0) {
++			/* match found */
++			*present = TRUE;
++			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++		}
++	}
++
++	/* no match found in the list */
++	*present = FALSE;
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++}
++
++/* 
++ * Convert a contiguous string name to internal form.  In general, the internal
++ * name returned (via the <output_name> parameter) will not be an MN; the
++ * exception to this is if the <input_name_type> indicates that the contiguous
++ * string provided via the <input_name_buffer> parameter is of type
++ * GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME, in which case the returned internal name will be an MN
++ * for the mechanism that exported the name.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_import_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer,
++	gss_OID input_name_type, gss_name_t * output_name)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* make sure we support the passed type */
++	if (input_name_type->length != GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE->length ||
++	    memcmp(input_name_type->elements, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE->elements, input_name_type->length) != 0)
++		return GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE;
++	
++	/* there is nothing special we have to do for this type so just duplicate
++	the  */
++	(*output_name) = _strdup(input_name_buffer->value);
++
++	if (output_name == NULL)
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Free GSSAPI-allocated storage associated with an internal-form name.
++ * Implementations are encouraged to set the name to GSS_C_NO_NAME on successful
++ * completion of this call.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_release_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_name_t * input_name)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* validate input */
++	if (input_name == NULL || *input_name == NULL)
++		return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
++	
++	/* deallocate memory associated with the name */
++	free(*input_name);
++	*input_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++	
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++}
++
++/*
++ * To produce a canonical contiguous string representation of a mechanism name
++ * (MN), suitable for direct comparison (e.g. with memcmp) for use in
++ * authorization functions (e.g. matching entries in an access-control list).
++ * The <input_name> parameter must specify a or by gss_canonicalize_name).
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_export_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, const gss_name_t input_name,
++	gss_buffer_t exported_name)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* convenience pointer to shorten the void */
++	const gss_OID_desc* const ntoid = GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
++
++	/* make sure we support the passed type */
++	if (strstr(input_name, "host@") == input_name)
++		return GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE;
++
++	/* get the lengths of all the parts of the string */
++	/* note: assumes short format for encoding oid length (i.e. less than 128)
++	*/
++	const uint16_t token_id = 0x0401;
++	const uint8_t oid_tag = 0x06;
++	const uint8_t oid_len = (uint8_t) ntoid->length;
++	const uint16_t oid_outer_len = sizeof(oid_tag) + sizeof(oid_len) + oid_len;
++	const uint32_t name_len = (uint16_t) strlen(input_name);
++
++	/* allocate space for the exported name */
++	exported_name->length = sizeof(token_id) + sizeof(oid_outer_len) + oid_outer_len + sizeof(name_len) + name_len;
++	exported_name->value = malloc(exported_name->length);
++	if (exported_name->value == NULL)
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* get big-endian values so we can just do a direct memcpy from the values
++	*/
++	const uint16_t token_id_be = htons(token_id);
++	const uint16_t oid_outer_len_be = htons(oid_outer_len);
++	const uint32_t name_len_be = htonl(name_len);
++
++	/* construct the encoded value */
++	uint8_t * output = exported_name->value;
++	memcpy(output, &token_id_be, sizeof(token_id_be)); output += sizeof(token_id_be);
++	memcpy(output, &oid_outer_len_be, sizeof(oid_outer_len_be)); output += sizeof(oid_outer_len_be);
++	memcpy(output, &oid_tag, sizeof(oid_tag)); output += sizeof(oid_tag);
++	memcpy(output, &oid_len, sizeof(oid_len)); output += sizeof(oid_len);
++	memcpy(output, ntoid->elements, ntoid->length); output += ntoid->length;
++	memcpy(output, &name_len_be, sizeof(name_len_be)); output += sizeof(name_len_be);
++	memcpy(output, input_name, name_len);
++
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Free storage associated with a buffer.  The storage must have been allocated
++ * by a GSS-API routine.  In addition to freeing the associated storage, the
++ * routine will zero the length field in the descriptor to which the buffer
++ * parameter refers, and implementations are encouraged to additionally set the
++ * pointer field in the descriptor to NULL.  Any buffer object returned by a
++ * GSS-API routine may be passed to gss_release_buffer (even if there is no
++ * storage associated with the buffer).
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_release_buffer(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_buffer_t buffer)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* deallocate the buffer associated with the buffer */
++	free(buffer->value);	
++	buffer->length = 0;
++	buffer->value = NULL;
++
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++}
++
++/* 
++ * Allows an application to acquire a handle for a pre-existing credential by
++ * name.  GSS-API implementations must impose a local access-control policy on
++ * callers of this routine to prevent unauthorized callers from acquiring
++ * credentials to which they are not entitled.  This routine is not intended to
++ * provide a "login to the network" function, as such a function would involve
++ * the creation of new credentials rather than merely acquiring a handle to
++ * existing credentials.  Such functions, if required, should be defined in
++ * implementation-specific extensions to the API.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_acquire_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_name_t desired_name,
++	OM_uint32 time_req, gss_OID_set desired_mechs, gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage,
++	gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, gss_OID_set *actual_mechs, OM_uint32 *time_rec)
++{
++	OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
++	SYSTEMTIME current_time_system;
++	wchar_t * desired_name_utf16 = NULL;
++	CredHandle cred_handle, *p_cred_handle = NULL;
++	
++
++	if (output_cred_handle != NULL)
++		*output_cred_handle = NULL;
++
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0)
++		goto done;
++
++	/* get the current time so we can determine expiration if requested */
++	GetSystemTime(&current_time_system);
++
++	/* translate credential usage parameters */
++	ULONG cred_usage_local = 0;
++	if (cred_usage == GSS_C_ACCEPT) cred_usage_local = SECPKG_CRED_INBOUND;
++	else if (cred_usage == GSS_C_INITIATE) cred_usage_local = SECPKG_CRED_OUTBOUND;
++	else if (cred_usage == GSS_C_BOTH) cred_usage_local = SECPKG_CRED_BOTH;
++
++	/* convert input name to unicode so we can process usernames with special characters */
++	if ((desired_name_utf16 = utf8_to_utf16(desired_name)) == NULL)
++		goto done;
++
++	/* acquire a handle to existing credentials -- in many cases the name will
++	 * be null in which case the credentials of the current user are used */
++	TimeStamp expiry;
++	SECURITY_STATUS status = SecFunctions->AcquireCredentialsHandleW(desired_name_utf16, MICROSOFT_KERBEROS_NAME_W, cred_usage_local,
++		NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &cred_handle, &expiry);
++
++	/* fail immediately if errors occurred */
++	if (status != SEC_E_OK)
++		goto done;
++	
++	p_cred_handle = &cred_handle;
++	/* copy credential data out of local buffer */
++	if (output_cred_handle != NULL) {
++		if ((*output_cred_handle = malloc(sizeof(struct cred_st))) == NULL)
++			goto done;
++		(*output_cred_handle)->isToken = 0;
++		(*output_cred_handle)->credHandle = cred_handle;
++	}
++	
++	/* determine expiration if requested */
++	if (time_rec != NULL) {
++		FILETIME current_time;
++		if (SystemTimeToFileTime(&current_time_system, &current_time) != 0)
++			*time_rec = (OM_uint32)(expiry.QuadPart - ((PLARGE_INTEGER)&current_time)->QuadPart) / 10000;
++		else
++			error("SystemTimeToFileTime failed with %lu", GetLastError());
++	}
++
++	/* set actual supported mechs if requested */
++	if (actual_mechs != NULL && gss_indicate_mechs(minor_status, actual_mechs) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		goto done;
++
++	ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++done:
++	if (desired_name_utf16)
++		free(desired_name_utf16);
++	if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		if (p_cred_handle)
++			SecFunctions->FreeCredentialsHandle(p_cred_handle);
++		if (output_cred_handle && *output_cred_handle) {
++			free(*output_cred_handle);
++			*output_cred_handle = NULL;
++		}
++	}
++
++	return ret;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Initiates the establishment of a security context between the application and
++ * a remote peer.  Initially, the input_token parameter should be specified
++ * either as GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, or as a pointer to a gss_buffer_desc object whose
++ * length field contains the value zero. The routine may return a output_token
++ * which should be transferred to the peer application, where the peer
++ * application will present it to gss_accept_sec_context.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_init_sec_context(
++	OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
++	gss_name_t target_name, gss_OID mech_type, OM_uint32 req_flags, OM_uint32 time_req, gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
++	gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_OID * actual_mech_type, gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
++	OM_uint32 * time_rec)
++{
++	OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
++	wchar_t * target_name_utf16 = NULL;
++	gss_ctx_id_t p_ctx_h = NULL;
++
++	output_token->value = NULL;
++
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		goto done;
++
++	/* make sure we support the passed type */
++	if (mech_type->length != GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE->length ||
++	    memcmp(mech_type->elements, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE->elements, mech_type->length) != 0) {
++		ret = GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE;
++		goto done;
++	}
++	
++	unsigned long sspi_req_flags = ISC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY;
++	if (req_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) 
++		sspi_req_flags |= ISC_REQ_MUTUAL_AUTH;
++	if (req_flags & GSS_C_CONF_FLAG) 
++		sspi_req_flags |= ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY;
++	if (req_flags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) 
++		sspi_req_flags |= ISC_REQ_REPLAY_DETECT;
++	if (req_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) 
++		sspi_req_flags |= ISC_REQ_DELEGATE;
++	if (req_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) 
++		sspi_req_flags |= ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY;
++	if (req_flags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) 
++		sspi_req_flags |= ISC_REQ_SEQUENCE_DETECT;
++
++	/* determine if this is the first call (no input buffer available) */
++	gss_buffer_desc empty_buffer = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	const int no_input_buffer = (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) || memcmp(input_token, &empty_buffer, sizeof(gss_buffer_desc)) == 0;
++
++	/* setup input buffer */
++	SecBuffer input_buffer_token = { (no_input_buffer) ? 0 : (unsigned long) input_token->length, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, (no_input_buffer) ? NULL : input_token->value };
++	SecBufferDesc input_buffer = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, 1, &input_buffer_token };
++
++	/* setup output buffer - will be dynamically allocated by function */
++	SecBuffer output_buffer_token = { 0, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, NULL };
++	SecBufferDesc output_buffer = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, 1, &output_buffer_token };
++
++	/* get the current time so we can determine expiration if requested */
++	SYSTEMTIME current_time_system;
++	GetSystemTime(&current_time_system);
++
++	/* acquire default cred handler if none specified */
++	CredHandle *pCredHandle = NULL;
++	if (claimant_cred_handle != NULL)
++		pCredHandle = &(claimant_cred_handle->credHandle);
++	
++	if (pCredHandle == NULL) {
++		static CredHandle cred_handle = { 0, 0 };
++		pCredHandle = &cred_handle;
++		if (cred_handle.dwLower == 0 && cred_handle.dwUpper == 0) {
++			TimeStamp expiry_cred;
++			if (SecFunctions->AcquireCredentialsHandleW(NULL, MICROSOFT_KERBEROS_NAME_W, SECPKG_CRED_OUTBOUND,
++			    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &cred_handle, &expiry_cred) != SEC_E_OK)
++				goto done;
++		}
++	}
++
++	/* condition the string for windows */
++	if ((target_name_utf16 = utf8_to_utf16(target_name)) == NULL)
++		goto done;
++
++	if (wcsncmp(target_name_utf16, L"host@", wcslen(L"host@")) == 0) 
++		*wcschr(target_name_utf16, L'@') = L'/';
++
++	TimeStamp expiry;
++	LONG sspi_ret_flags = 0;
++	CtxtHandle out_context;
++
++	const SECURITY_STATUS status = SecFunctions->InitializeSecurityContextW(pCredHandle,
++		(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ? NULL : *context_handle,
++		target_name_utf16, sspi_req_flags, 0, SECURITY_NATIVE_DREP, (no_input_buffer) ? NULL : &input_buffer,
++		0, (*context_handle != NULL) ? NULL : &out_context, &output_buffer, &sspi_ret_flags, (time_rec == NULL) ? NULL : &expiry);
++
++	/* check if error occurred */
++	if (status != SEC_E_OK && status != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		goto done;
++	
++	/* copy output token to output buffer */
++	output_token->length = output_buffer_token.cbBuffer;
++	if ((output_token->value = malloc(output_token->length)) == NULL)
++		goto done;
++
++	memcpy(output_token->value, output_buffer_token.pvBuffer, output_token->length);
++	SecFunctions->FreeContextBuffer(output_buffer_token.pvBuffer);
++
++	/* if requested, translate returned flags that are actually available */
++	if (ret_flags != NULL) {
++		*ret_flags = 0;
++		if (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_MUTUAL_AUTH) 
++			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG;
++		if (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY) 
++			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_CONF_FLAG;
++		if (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_REPLAY_DETECT) 
++			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG;
++		if (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_DELEGATE) 
++			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
++		if (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_INTEGRITY) 
++			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG;
++		if (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_SEQUENCE_DETECT) 
++			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG;
++	}
++
++	/* report if delegation was requested by not fulfilled */
++	if ((sspi_req_flags & ISC_REQ_DELEGATE) != 0 && (sspi_ret_flags & ISC_RET_DELEGATE) == 0)
++		debug("sspi delegation was requested but not fulfilled");
++
++	/* if requested, translate the expiration time to number of second */
++	if (time_rec != NULL) {
++		FILETIME current_time;
++		if (SystemTimeToFileTime(&current_time_system, &current_time) != 0)
++			*time_rec = (OM_uint32)(expiry.QuadPart - ((PLARGE_INTEGER)&current_time)->QuadPart) / 10000;
++		else
++			error("SystemTimeToFileTime failed with %lu", GetLastError());
++	}
++
++	/* if requested, return the supported mechanism oid */
++	if (actual_mech_type != NULL)
++		*actual_mech_type = GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
++	
++	/* copy the credential context structure to the caller */
++	if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
++		if ((p_ctx_h = malloc(sizeof(out_context))) == NULL)
++			goto done;
++		*context_handle = p_ctx_h;
++		memcpy(*context_handle, &out_context, sizeof(out_context));
++	}
++
++	ret = (status == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ? GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++done:
++	if (target_name_utf16)
++		free(target_name_utf16);
++
++	if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE && ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++		if (output_token->value) {
++			free(output_token->value);
++			output_token->value = NULL;
++		}
++		if (p_ctx_h)
++			free(p_ctx_h);
++		
++	}
++
++	return ret;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Informs GSS-API that the specified credential handle is no longer required by
++ * the application, and frees associated resources. Implementations are
++ * encouraged to set the cred_handle to GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL on successful
++ * completion of this call.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_release_cred(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_cred_id_t * cred_handle)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	if (*cred_handle != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
++		if ((*cred_handle)->isToken) {
++			CloseHandle((*cred_handle)->token);
++			if ((*cred_handle)->token == sspi_auth_user)
++				sspi_auth_user = 0;
++		}
++		else
++			SecFunctions->FreeCredentialsHandle(&(*cred_handle)->credHandle);
++		free(*cred_handle);
++		*cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++	}
++
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Delete a security context.  gss_delete_sec_context will delete the local data
++ * structures associated with the specified security context, and may generate
++ * an output_token, which when passed to the peer gss_process_context_token will
++ * instruct it to do likewise.  If no token is required by the mechanism, the
++ * GSS-API should set the length field of the output_token (if provided) to
++ * zero.  No further security services may be obtained using the context
++ * specified by context_handle.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, 
++	gss_buffer_t output_token)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* input sanity checks */
++	if (context_handle == NULL)
++		return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++	if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
++		free(output_token->value);
++		output_token->value = NULL;
++		output_token->length = 0;
++	}
++
++	/* cleanup security context */
++	SecFunctions->DeleteSecurityContext(*context_handle);
++	free(*context_handle);
++	*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Verifies that a cryptographic MIC, contained in the token parameter, fits the
++ * supplied message.  The qop_state parameter allows a message recipient to
++ * determine the strength of protection that was applied to the message.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_verify_mic(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++	gss_buffer_t message_buffer, gss_buffer_t message_token, gss_qop_t * qop_state)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* translate the message and token to a security buffer so we can verify it */
++	SecBuffer verify_buffer_set[] = { 
++		{ (unsigned long) message_buffer->length, SECBUFFER_DATA, message_buffer->value },
++		{ (unsigned long) message_token->length, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, message_token->value } };
++	SecBufferDesc verify_buffer = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, _countof(verify_buffer_set), verify_buffer_set };
++
++	/* verify message and signature */
++	ULONG qop;
++	const SECURITY_STATUS status = SecFunctions->VerifySignature(context_handle, &verify_buffer, 0, &qop);
++
++	/* translate error codes */
++	OM_uint32 return_code = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++	if (status != SEC_E_OK) {
++		/* translate specific error */
++		if (status == SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED) return_code = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
++		else if (status == SEC_E_OUT_OF_SEQUENCE) return_code = GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN;
++		else if (status == SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN) return_code = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
++		else if (status == SEC_E_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) return_code = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
++		else if (status == SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED) return_code = GSS_S_BAD_QOP;
++		else return_code = GSS_S_FAILURE;
++	}
++
++	if (qop_state != NULL)
++		*qop_state = (OM_uint32) GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
++	
++	return return_code;
++}
++
++/* 
++ * Generates a cryptographic MIC for the supplied message, and places the MIC in
++ * a token for transfer to the peer application. The qop_req parameter allows a
++ * choice between several cryptographic algorithms, if supported by the chosen
++ * mechanism.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_get_mic(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++	gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_buffer_t message_buffer, gss_buffer_t message_token)
++{
++	OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	message_token->value = NULL;	
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0)
++		goto done;
++
++	/* determine the max possible signature and allocate memory to support it */
++	SecPkgContext_Sizes sizes;
++	if (SecFunctions->QueryContextAttributesW(context_handle, SECPKG_ATTR_SIZES, &sizes) != SEC_E_OK)
++		goto done;
++	if ((message_token->value = malloc(sizes.cbMaxSignature)) == NULL)
++		goto done;
++
++	message_token->length = sizes.cbMaxSignature;
++
++	/* translate the message and token to a security buffer so we can sign it */
++	SecBuffer sign_buffer_set[] = {
++		{ (unsigned long) message_buffer->length, SECBUFFER_DATA, message_buffer->value },
++		{ (unsigned long) message_token->length, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, message_token->value } };
++	SecBufferDesc sign_buffer = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, _countof(sign_buffer_set), sign_buffer_set };
++
++	/* attempt to sign the data */
++	ULONG qop = 0;
++	const SECURITY_STATUS status = SecFunctions->MakeSignature(context_handle, qop, &sign_buffer, 0);
++
++	/* translate error codes */
++	if (status != SEC_E_OK)  {
++		if (status == SEC_E_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) 
++			ret = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
++		else if (status == SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED) 
++			ret = GSS_S_BAD_QOP;
++		goto done;
++	}
++
++	ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++
++done:
++	if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		if (message_token->value) {
++			free(message_token->value);
++			message_token->value = NULL;
++		}
++	}
++	return ret;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Allows a remotely initiated security context between the application and a
++ * remote peer to be established.  The routine may return a output_token which
++ * should be transferred to the peer application, where the peer application
++ * will present it to gss_init_sec_context. If no token need be sent,
++ * gss_accept_sec_context will indicate this by setting the length field of the
++ * output_token argument to zero.  To complete the context establishment, one or
++ * more reply tokens may be required from the peer application; if so,
++ * gss_accept_sec_context will return a status flag of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, in
++ * which case it should be called again when the reply token is received from
++ * the peer application, passing the token to gss_accept_sec_context via the
++ * input_token parameters.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
++	gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle, gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
++	gss_name_t * src_name, gss_OID * mech_type, gss_buffer_t output_token,
++	OM_uint32 * ret_flags, OM_uint32 * time_rec, gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle)
++{
++	OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
++	gss_ctx_id_t p_ctx_h = NULL;
++
++	*src_name = NULL;
++
++	if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
++		*delegated_cred_handle = NULL;
++
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		goto done;
++
++	/* setup input buffer */
++	SecBuffer input_buffer_token = { (unsigned long) input_token_buffer->length, 
++		SECBUFFER_TOKEN | SECBUFFER_READONLY, input_token_buffer->value };
++	SecBufferDesc input_buffer = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, 1, &input_buffer_token };
++
++	/* setup output buffer - will be dynamically allocated by function */
++	SecBuffer output_buffer_token = { 0, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, NULL };
++	SecBufferDesc output_buffer = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, 1, &output_buffer_token };
++
++	/* get the current time so we can determine expiration if requested */
++	SYSTEMTIME current_time_system;
++	GetSystemTime(&current_time_system);
++
++	TimeStamp expiry;
++	CtxtHandle sspi_context_handle;
++	ULONG sspi_ret_flags = 0;
++	ULONG sspi_req_flags = ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY | ASC_REQ_MUTUAL_AUTH | ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY | 
++		ASC_REQ_DELEGATE | ASC_REQ_SEQUENCE_DETECT | ASC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY;
++
++	/* call sspi accept security context function */
++	const SECURITY_STATUS status = SecFunctions->AcceptSecurityContext(&acceptor_cred_handle->credHandle, 
++		(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ? NULL : *context_handle, &input_buffer,
++		sspi_req_flags, SECURITY_NATIVE_DREP, 
++		(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ? &sspi_context_handle : *context_handle, 
++		&output_buffer, &sspi_ret_flags, &expiry);
++
++	/* translate error codes */
++	if (status != SEC_E_OK && status != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++		if (status == SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN) 
++			ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
++		else if (status == SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE) 
++			ret = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++		goto done;
++	}
++
++	/* only do checks on the finalized context (no continue needed) */
++	if (status == SEC_E_OK) {
++		/* validate accepted context is actually a host service ticket */
++		SecPkgContext_NativeNamesW target;
++		if (SecFunctions->QueryContextAttributesW((*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ? &sspi_context_handle : *context_handle,
++		    SECPKG_ATTR_NATIVE_NAMES, &target) != SEC_E_OK)
++			goto done;
++		
++		const int valid_spn = _wcsnicmp(target.sServerName, L"host/", wcslen(L"host/")) == 0;
++		FreeContextBuffer(target.sServerName);
++		FreeContextBuffer(target.sClientName);
++		if (valid_spn == 0) {
++			debug("client passed an invalid principal name");
++			ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
++			goto done;
++		}
++	}
++
++	/* copy the context handler to the caller */
++	if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
++		if ((p_ctx_h = malloc(sizeof(CtxtHandle))) == NULL)
++			goto done;
++		*context_handle = p_ctx_h;
++		memcpy(*context_handle, &sspi_context_handle, sizeof(CtxtHandle));
++	}
++
++	/* if requested, translate returned flags that are actually available */
++	if (ret_flags != NULL) {
++		*ret_flags = 0;
++		if (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_MUTUAL_AUTH) 
++			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG;
++		if (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY) 
++			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_CONF_FLAG;
++		if (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_REPLAY_DETECT) 
++			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG;
++		if (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_DELEGATE) 
++			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
++		if (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_INTEGRITY) 
++			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG;
++		if (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_SEQUENCE_DETECT) 
++			*ret_flags |= GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG;
++	}
++
++	/* report if delegation was requested by not fulfilled */
++	if ((sspi_req_flags & ASC_REQ_DELEGATE) != 0 && (sspi_ret_flags & ASC_RET_DELEGATE) == 0)
++		debug("%s: delegation was requested but not fulfilled", __FUNCTION__);
++	
++	/* if provided, specify the mechanism */
++	if (mech_type != NULL)
++		*mech_type = GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
++	
++	/* if requested, translate the expiration time to number of second */
++	if (time_rec != NULL) {
++		FILETIME current_time;
++		if (SystemTimeToFileTime(&current_time_system, &current_time) != 0)
++			*time_rec = (OM_uint32)(expiry.QuadPart - ((PLARGE_INTEGER)&current_time)->QuadPart) / 10000;
++		else
++			error("SystemTimeToFileTime failed with %lu", GetLastError());
++	}
++
++	/* only do checks on the finalized context (no continue needed) */
++	if (status == SEC_E_OK) {
++		/* extract the username from the context handle will be domain\samaccountname format */
++		SecPkgContext_NamesW NamesBuffer;
++		if (SecFunctions->QueryContextAttributesW(*context_handle, SECPKG_ATTR_NAMES, &NamesBuffer) != SEC_E_OK)
++			goto done;
++		
++		/* copy to internal utf8 string and free the sspi string */
++		if ((*src_name = utf16_to_utf8(NamesBuffer.sUserName)) == NULL)
++			goto done;
++
++		FreeContextBuffer(NamesBuffer.sUserName);
++	}
++
++	/* copy output token to output buffer */
++	output_token->length = output_buffer_token.cbBuffer;
++	output_token->value = malloc(output_token->length);
++	memcpy(output_token->value, output_buffer_token.pvBuffer, output_token->length);
++	SecFunctions->FreeContextBuffer(output_buffer_token.pvBuffer);
++
++	/* get the user token for impersonation */
++	if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL) {
++		if ((*delegated_cred_handle = malloc(sizeof(struct cred_st))) == NULL)
++			goto done;
++		if (SecFunctions->QuerySecurityContextToken(*context_handle, &sspi_auth_user) != SEC_E_OK)
++			goto done;
++		(*delegated_cred_handle)->isToken = 1;
++		(*delegated_cred_handle)->token = sspi_auth_user;
++	}
++
++	ret = (status == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ? GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++
++done:
++	if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE && ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++		if (p_ctx_h)
++			free(p_ctx_h);
++		if (*src_name)
++			free(*src_name);
++		if (delegated_cred_handle && *delegated_cred_handle)
++			free(*delegated_cred_handle);
++	}
++	return ret;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of an opaque
++ * internal-form name for display purposes.  The syntax of a printable name is
++ * defined by the GSS-API implementation.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_display_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_name_t input_name, 
++	gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, gss_OID * output_name_type)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	output_name_buffer->length = strlen(input_name) + 1;
++	if ((output_name_buffer->value = _strdup(input_name)) == NULL)
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* set the output oid type if requested */
++	if (output_name_type != NULL)
++		*output_name_type = GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
++	
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of a GSS-API status
++ * code, for display to the user or for logging purposes.  Since some status
++ * values may indicate multiple conditions, applications may need to call
++ * gss_display_status multiple times, each call generating a single text string.
++ * The message_context parameter is used by gss_display_status to store state
++ * information about which error messages have already been extracted from a
++ * given status_value; message_context must be initialized to 0 by the
++ * application prior to the first call, and gss_display_status will return a
++ * non-zero value in this parameter if there are further messages to extract.
++ */
++OM_uint32 
++gss_display_status(OM_uint32 * minor_status, OM_uint32 status_value, int status_type,
++	gss_OID mech_type, OM_uint32 * message_context, gss_buffer_t status_string)
++{
++	if (ssh_gss_sspi_init(minor_status) == 0) 
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* lookup textual representation of the numeric status code */
++	char * message_string = NULL;
++	if (status_value == GSS_S_COMPLETE) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_COMPLETE";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_MECH) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_MECH";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_NAME) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_NAME";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_QOP) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_QOP";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_SIG) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_SIG";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_BAD_STATUS) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_BAD_STATUS";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_FAILURE) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_FAILURE";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_NO_CRED) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_NO_CRED";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE";
++	else if (status_value == GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN) 
++		message_string = "GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN";
++
++	/* copy local status string to the output buffer */
++	status_string->length = strlen(message_string) + 1;
++	if ((status_string->value = _strdup(message_string)) == NULL)
++		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
++
++	/* no supplementary messages available */
++	*message_context = 0;
++
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++}
++
++/*
++ * The function ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok and gssapi_kerberos_mech structure
++ * are referenced in gss-serv.c and are required in order for the calling
++ * code to accept negotiate a kerberos token.
++ */
++
++static int 
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
++{
++	/*
++	 * This check is important since it makes sure that the username string
++	 * that the user passed (e.g. user@host) matches the user authenticated
++	 * via SSPI.  If this check fails, the authentication process will move
++	 * onto the next available method.
++	 */
++	struct passwd * user = getpwnam(name);
++	if (user == NULL)
++	{
++		error("sspi getpwnam failed to get user from user-provided, resolved user '%s'", name);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	if (_stricmp(client->displayname.value, user->pw_name) != 0) {
++		/* check failed */
++		debug("sspi user '%s' did not match user-provided, resolved user '%s'", 
++			(char *) client->displayname.value, name);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
++	"toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
++	"Kerberos",
++	{sizeof(GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_STR) - 1, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_STR},
++	NULL,
++	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++};
++
++#endif /* KRB5 */
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 53993d6..27da39e 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -57,12 +57,12 @@ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+ 
+-#ifdef KRB5
++#if defined(KRB5) || defined (SSPI)
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+ #endif
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= {
+-#ifdef KRB5
++#if defined(KRB5) || defined (SSPI)
+ 	&gssapi_kerberos_mech,
+ #endif
+ 	&gssapi_null_mech,
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index a99d7f0..2c90eb2 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 
++#ifdef SSPI
++#include "contrib/win32/win32compat/inc/gssapi.h"
++#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
++#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
++#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
++#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+ #include <gssapi.h>
+ #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)

regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
 	struct sshbuf *buf, *pw;
 	BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
 	char *cp;
+	const BIGNUM *n, *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key;
 
 	TEST_START("load passphrase");
 	pw = load_text_file("pw");
@@ -58,7 +59,8 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
 	sshbuf_free(buf);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
 	a = load_bignum("rsa1_1.param.n");
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a);
+	RSA_get0_key(k1->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(n, a);
 	BN_free(a);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
@@ -109,9 +111,11 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
 	a = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.n");
 	b = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.p");
 	c = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.q");
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a);
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->p, b);
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->q, c);
+	RSA_get0_key(k1->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
+	RSA_get0_factors(k1->rsa, &p, &q);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(n, a);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(p, b);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(q, c);
 	BN_free(a);
 	BN_free(b);
 	BN_free(c);
@@ -200,9 +204,11 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
 	a = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.g");
 	b = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.priv");
 	c = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.pub");
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->g, a);
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, b);
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->pub_key, c);
+	DSA_get0_pqg(k1->dsa, NULL, NULL, &g);
+	DSA_get0_key(k1->dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(g, a);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(priv_key, b);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(pub_key, c);
 	BN_free(a);
 	BN_free(b);
 	BN_free(c);

regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c

@@ -197,9 +197,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
 	sshkey_free(k1);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
@@ -207,9 +204,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
 	sshkey_free(k1);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
@@ -217,8 +211,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
 	sshkey_free(k1);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
@@ -244,9 +236,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0);
 	sshkey_free(k1);
 	TEST_DONE();
@@ -255,8 +244,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_DSA);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0);
 	sshkey_free(k1);
 	TEST_DONE();
@@ -295,18 +282,13 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->n, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->e, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->p, NULL);
-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(kr->rsa->n), 1024);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(RSA_bits(kr->rsa), 1024);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
 	TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA");
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->g, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
@@ -333,9 +315,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1);
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
 	TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA");
@@ -349,8 +328,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1);
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
 	TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA");

rsa.c

@@ -76,11 +76,14 @@ rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
 {
 	u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL;
 	int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	const BIGNUM *e, *n;
 
-	if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e))
+	RSA_get0_key(key, &n, &e, NULL);
+
+	if (BN_num_bits(e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(e))
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 
-	olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+	olen = BN_num_bytes(n);
 	if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
@@ -122,8 +125,11 @@ rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
 {
 	u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL;
 	int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	const BIGNUM *n;
+
+	RSA_get0_key(key, &n, NULL, NULL);
 
-	olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+	olen = BN_num_bytes(n);
 	if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
@@ -157,31 +163,42 @@ rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
 	return r;
 }
 
-/* calculate p-1 and q-1 */
+/* calculate d mod p-1 and d mod q-1 */
 int
-rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa)
+rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *iqmp)
 {
 	BIGNUM *aux = NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 	int r;
+	const BIGNUM *p, *q, *d;
+	BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL;
+
+	RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
+	RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
 
-	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (aux = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
-	    (BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
-	    (BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
-	    (BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0)) {
+	if ((BN_sub(aux, q, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
+	    (BN_mod(dmq1, d, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
+	    (BN_sub(aux, p, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
+	    (BN_mod(dmp1, d, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
+	    (RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp) == 0)) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
+	dmp1 = NULL;
+	dmq1 = NULL;
 	r = 0;
  out:
 	BN_clear_free(aux);
+	BN_clear_free(dmp1);
+	BN_clear_free(dmq1);
 	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 	return r;
 }

rsa.h

@@ -21,6 +21,6 @@
 
 int	 rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
 int	 rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
-int	 rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *);
+int	 rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *, BIGNUM *);
 
 #endif				/* RSA_H */

ssh-agent.c

@@ -258,12 +258,12 @@ process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) {
 		if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
+			const BIGNUM *r_n, *r_e;
+			RSA_get0_key(id->key->rsa, &r_n, &r_e, NULL);
 			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg,
-			    BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
-			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg,
-			    id->key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg,
-			    id->key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+			    BN_num_bits(r_n))) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, r_e)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, r_n)) != 0)
 				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
 				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
 #endif
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
 	struct sshbuf *msg;
 	struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
 	struct sshkey *key;
+	BIGNUM *r_n = NULL, *r_e = NULL;
 
 	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
@@ -310,11 +311,16 @@ process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
 	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
 
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, challenge)))
+	if ((r_n = BN_new()) == NULL || (r_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, r_e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, r_n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, challenge)) ||
+	    RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, r_n, r_e, NULL) == 0) {
+		BN_free(r_n);
+		BN_free(r_e);
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	}
 
 	/* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */
 	if (sshbuf_len(e->request) == 0)
@@ -450,6 +456,7 @@ process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 	u_char *blob;
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	u_int bits;
+	BIGNUM *r_n = NULL, *r_e = NULL;
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
 
 	switch (version) {
@@ -459,10 +466,15 @@ process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 			error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
 			return;
 		}
-		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &bits)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+		if ((r_n = BN_new()) == NULL || (r_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &bits)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, r_e)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, r_n)) != 0 ||
+		    RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, r_n, r_e, NULL) == 0) {
+			BN_free(r_n);
+			BN_free(r_e);
 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		}
 
 		if (bits != sshkey_size(key))
 			logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: "
@@ -565,23 +577,46 @@ agent_decode_rsa1(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey **kp)
 {
 	struct sshkey *k = NULL;
 	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL,
+	    *iqmp = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
 
 	*kp = NULL;
 	if ((k = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, NULL)) != 0 ||		/* ignored */
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+	if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL || (e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (d = BN_new()) == NULL || (iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (q = BN_new()) == NULL || (p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, NULL)) != 0 ||		/* ignored */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, d)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, iqmp)) != 0 ||
 	    /* SSH1 and SSL have p and q swapped */
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->q)) != 0 ||	/* p */
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->p)) != 0) 	/* q */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, q)) != 0 ||	/* p */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, p)) != 0 || 	/* q */
+	    RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, n, e, d) == 0) {
+		BN_free(n);
+		BN_free(e);
+		BN_free(d);
+		BN_free(p);
+		BN_free(q);
+		BN_free(iqmp);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, p, q) == 0) {
+		BN_free(p);
+		BN_free(q);
+		BN_free(iqmp);
 		goto out;
+	}
+	if (RSA_set0_crt_params(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, iqmp) == 0) {
+		BN_free(iqmp);
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* Generate additional parameters */
-	if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0)
+	if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa, NULL)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	/* enable blinding */
 	if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {

ssh-dss.c

@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	const BIGNUM *r, *s;
 
 	if (lenp != NULL)
 		*lenp = 0;
@@ -76,15 +77,16 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r);
-	slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s);
+	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
+	rlen = BN_num_bytes(r);
+	slen = BN_num_bytes(s);
 	if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
-	BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
-	BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
+	BN_bn2bin(r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
+	BN_bn2bin(s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
 
 	if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
 		if (sigp != NULL) {
@@ -137,6 +139,7 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
 	char *ktype = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
 
 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
@@ -177,16 +180,19 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 
 	/* parse signature */
 	if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+	    (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) ||
-	    (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL)) {
+	if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, r) == NULL) ||
+	    (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, s) == NULL) ||
+	    (DSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) == 0)) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
+	r = NULL;
+	s = NULL;
 
 	/* sha1 the data */
 	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
@@ -207,8 +213,9 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 
  out:
 	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-	if (sig != NULL)
-		DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+	BN_free(r);
+	BN_free(s);
+	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
 	sshbuf_free(b);
 	free(ktype);
 	if (sigblob != NULL) {

ssh-ecdsa.c

@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 	size_t len, dlen;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	const BIGNUM *r, *s;
 
 	if (lenp != NULL)
 		*lenp = 0;
@@ -80,8 +81,9 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->r)) != 0 ||
-	    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->s)) != 0)
+	ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, r)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, s)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 ||
 	    (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0)
@@ -119,6 +121,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
 	char *ktype = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
 
 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
@@ -147,15 +150,23 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 	}
 
 	/* parse signature */
-	if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+	if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->r) != 0 ||
-	    sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->s) != 0) {
+	if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, r) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, s) != 0) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
 		goto out;
 	}
+	if (ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) == 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	r = NULL;
+	s = NULL;
 	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
 		goto out;
@@ -180,8 +191,9 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
 	sshbuf_free(b);
-	if (sig != NULL)
-		ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+	BN_free(r);
+	BN_free(s);
+	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
 	free(ktype);
 	return ret;
 }

ssh-gss.h

@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 
+#ifdef SSPI
+#include "contrib/win32/win32compat/inc/gssapi.h"
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+#endif
+
 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
 #include <gssapi.h>
 #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)

ssh-keygen.c

@@ -495,40 +495,67 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen)
 	free(type);
 
 	switch (key->type) {
-	case KEY_DSA:
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->p);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->g);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->q);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
+	case KEY_DSA: {
+			BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+
+			if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+				fatal("BN_new() failed");
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, p);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, g);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, q);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, pub_key);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, priv_key);
+			if (DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, p, q, g) == 0 ||
+			    DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, pub_key, priv_key) == 0) {
+				fatal("failed to set DSA key");
+			}
+		}
 		break;
-	case KEY_RSA:
-		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 ||
-		    (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) ||
-		    (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0))
-			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-		e = e1;
-		debug("e %lx", e);
-		if (e < 30) {
-			e <<= 8;
-			e += e2;
+	case KEY_RSA: {
+			BIGNUM *bn_e = NULL, *bn_d = NULL, *bn_n = NULL, *bn_iqmp = NULL, *bn_p = NULL, *bn_q = NULL;
+
+			if ((bn_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (bn_d = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (bn_n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (bn_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (bn_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (bn_q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+				fatal("BN_new() failed");
+
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 ||
+			    (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) ||
+			    (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0))
+				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			e = e1;
 			debug("e %lx", e);
-			e <<= 8;
-			e += e3;
-			debug("e %lx", e);
-		}
-		if (!BN_set_word(key->rsa->e, e)) {
-			sshbuf_free(b);
-			sshkey_free(key);
-			return NULL;
+			if (e < 30) {
+				e <<= 8;
+				e += e2;
+				debug("e %lx", e);
+				e <<= 8;
+				e += e3;
+				debug("e %lx", e);
+			}
+			if (!BN_set_word(bn_e, e)) {
+				sshbuf_free(b);
+				sshkey_free(key);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_d);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_n);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_iqmp);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_q);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_p);
+			if (RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, bn_n, bn_e, bn_d) == 0 ||
+			    RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, bn_p, bn_q) == 0)
+				fatal("Failed to set RSA parameters");
+			if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa, bn_iqmp)) != 0)
+				fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 		}
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->d);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->n);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->q);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->p);
-		if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa)) != 0)
-			fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 		break;
 	}
 	rlen = sshbuf_len(b);
@@ -636,7 +663,7 @@ do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
 		    identity_file);
 	}
 	fclose(fp);
-	switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)) {
+	switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
 	case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
 		if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
 			fatal("sshkey_new failed");
@@ -660,7 +687,7 @@ do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
 #endif
 	default:
 		fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__,
-		    EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type));
+		    EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey));
 	}
 	EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
 	return;
@@ -1702,6 +1729,7 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 	pkcs11_terminate();
 #endif
+	free(ca);
 	exit(0);
 }
 

ssh-keyscan.c

@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ keygrab_ssh1(con *c)
 	static struct sshbuf *msg;
 	int r;
 	u_char type;
+	BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL;
 
 	if (rsa == NULL) {
 		if ((rsa = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) {
@@ -213,16 +214,20 @@ keygrab_ssh1(con *c)
 		sshbuf_reset(msg);
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8)) != 0 || /* cookie */
+	if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL || (e = BN_new()) == NULL || 
+	    (r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8)) != 0 || /* cookie */
 	    /* server key */
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
 	    /* host key */
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->n)) != 0) {
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, n)) != 0 ||
+	    RSA_set0_key(rsa->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0) {
  buf_err:
+		BN_free(n);
+		BN_free(e);
 		error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 		sshbuf_reset(msg);
 		return NULL;

ssh-pkcs11-client.c

@@ -143,12 +143,14 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
 static int
 wrap_key(RSA *rsa)
 {
-	static RSA_METHOD helper_rsa;
+	static RSA_METHOD *helper_rsa;
 
-	memcpy(&helper_rsa, RSA_get_default_method(), sizeof(helper_rsa));
-	helper_rsa.name = "ssh-pkcs11-helper";
-	helper_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt;
-	RSA_set_method(rsa, &helper_rsa);
+	if (helper_rsa == NULL) {
+		helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method());
+		RSA_meth_set1_name(helper_rsa, "ssh-pkcs11-helper");
+		RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(helper_rsa, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt);
+	}
+	RSA_set_method(rsa, helper_rsa);
 	return (0);
 }
 

ssh-pkcs11.c

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct pkcs11_key {
 	struct pkcs11_provider	*provider;
 	CK_ULONG		slotidx;
 	int			(*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa);
-	RSA_METHOD		rsa_method;
+	RSA_METHOD		*rsa_method;
 	char			*keyid;
 	int			keyid_len;
 };
@@ -326,13 +326,21 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
 		k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
 		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
 	}
-	k11->orig_finish = def->finish;
-	memcpy(&k11->rsa_method, def, sizeof(k11->rsa_method));
-	k11->rsa_method.name = "pkcs11";
-	k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt;
-	k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_dec = pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt;
-	k11->rsa_method.finish = pkcs11_rsa_finish;
-	RSA_set_method(rsa, &k11->rsa_method);
+	k11->orig_finish = RSA_meth_get_finish(def);
+	if ((k11->rsa_method = RSA_meth_dup(def)) == NULL ||
+	    RSA_meth_set1_name(k11->rsa_method, "pkcs11") == 0 ||
+	    RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt) == 0 ||
+	    RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt) == 0 ||
+	    RSA_meth_set_finish(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_finish) == 0) {
+		RSA_meth_free(k11->rsa_method);
+		k11->rsa_method = NULL;
+		pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
+		free(k11->keyid);
+		free(k11);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	RSA_set_method(rsa, k11->rsa_method);
 	RSA_set_app_data(rsa, k11);
 	return (0);
 }
@@ -460,6 +468,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
 	CK_ULONG		nfound;
 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;
 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f;
+	const BIGNUM		*n, *e;
 
 	f = p->function_list;
 	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
@@ -512,10 +521,14 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
 			if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
 				error("RSA_new failed");
 			} else {
-				rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue,
+				BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
+
+				rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue,
 				    attribs[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
-				rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue,
+				rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue,
 				    attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
+				if (RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL) == 0)
+					error("RSA_set0_key failed");
 			}
 		} else {
 			cp = attribs[2].pValue;
@@ -525,17 +538,18 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
 			    == NULL) {
 				error("d2i_X509 failed");
 			} else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL ||
-			    evp->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
-			    evp->pkey.rsa == NULL) {
+			    EVP_PKEY_id(evp) != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
+			    EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp) == NULL) {
 				debug("X509_get_pubkey failed or no rsa");
-			} else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(evp->pkey.rsa))
+			} else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp)))
 			    == NULL) {
 				error("RSAPublicKey_dup");
 			}
 			if (x509)
 				X509_free(x509);
 		}
-		if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e &&
+		RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+		if (rsa && n && e &&
 		    pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) {
 			key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
 			key->rsa = rsa;

ssh-rsa.c

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(alg_ident);
 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
-	    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+	    RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
 	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 
 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL ||
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
-	    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
+	    RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 

sshconnect.c

@@ -1752,6 +1752,7 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
 	char *server_user, *local_user;
 
 	local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+	free(pw);
 	server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
 
 	/* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */

sshconnect1.c

@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ try_agent_authentication(void)
 	u_char response[16];
 	size_t i;
 	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	const BIGNUM *n;
 	struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL;
 
 	/* Get connection to the agent. */
@@ -96,8 +97,9 @@ try_agent_authentication(void)
 		    idlist->comments[i]);
 
 		/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+		RSA_get0_key(idlist->keys[i]->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
 		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
-		packet_put_bignum(idlist->keys[i]->rsa->n);
+		packet_put_bignum((BIGNUM *)n);
 		packet_send();
 		packet_write_wait();
 
@@ -220,6 +222,7 @@ static int
 try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
 {
 	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	const BIGNUM *n;
 	Key *public, *private;
 	char buf[300], *passphrase = NULL, *comment, *authfile;
 	int i, perm_ok = 1, type, quit;
@@ -231,8 +234,9 @@ try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
 	debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment);
 
 	/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+	RSA_get0_key(public->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
 	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
-	packet_put_bignum(public->rsa->n);
+	packet_put_bignum((BIGNUM *)n);
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 
@@ -348,15 +352,17 @@ try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, Key * host_key)
 {
 	int type;
 	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	const BIGNUM *n, *e;
 
 	debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication.");
 
 	/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+	RSA_get0_key(host_key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
 	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
 	packet_put_cstring(local_user);
-	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
-	packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
-	packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
+	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(n));
+	packet_put_bignum((BIGNUM *)e);
+	packet_put_bignum((BIGNUM *)n);
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 
@@ -502,6 +508,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 {
 	int i;
 	BIGNUM *key;
+	BIGNUM *server_n = NULL, *server_e = NULL,
+	    *host_n = NULL, *host_e = NULL;
 	Key *host_key, *server_key;
 	int bits, rbits;
 	int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
@@ -523,10 +531,14 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	if ((server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
 	bits = packet_get_int();
-	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e);
-	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n);
-
-	rbits = BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n);
+	if ((server_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (server_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new() failed");
+	packet_get_bignum(server_e);
+	packet_get_bignum(server_n);
+	RSA_set0_key(server_key->rsa, server_n, server_e, NULL);
+
+	rbits = BN_num_bits(server_n);
 	if (bits != rbits) {
 		logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: "
 		    "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
@@ -536,10 +548,14 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	if ((host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
 	bits = packet_get_int();
-	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
-	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
-
-	rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n);
+	if ((host_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (host_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new() failed");
+	packet_get_bignum(host_e);
+	packet_get_bignum(host_n);
+	RSA_set0_key(host_key->rsa, host_n, host_e, NULL);
+
+	rbits = BN_num_bits(host_n);
 	if (bits != rbits) {
 		logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: "
 		    "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
@@ -555,14 +571,14 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	packet_check_eom();
 
 	debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).",
-	    BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
+	    BN_num_bits(server_n), BN_num_bits(host_n));
 
 	if (verify_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key) == -1)
 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
 
 	client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN;
 
-	derive_ssh1_session_id(host_key->rsa->n, server_key->rsa->n, cookie, session_id);
+	derive_ssh1_session_id(host_n, server_n, cookie, session_id);
 
 	/*
 	 * Generate an encryption key for the session.   The key is a 256 bit
@@ -597,14 +613,14 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	 * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the
 	 * server (key with smaller modulus first).
 	 */
-	if (BN_cmp(server_key->rsa->n, host_key->rsa->n) < 0) {
+	if (BN_cmp(server_n, host_n) < 0) {
 		/* Public key has smaller modulus. */
-		if (BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) <
-		    BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+		if (BN_num_bits(host_n) <
+		    BN_num_bits(server_n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
 			fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < server_key %d + "
 			    "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
-			    BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n),
-			    BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n),
+			    BN_num_bits(host_n),
+			    BN_num_bits(server_n),
 			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
 		}
 		if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa) != 0 ||
@@ -612,12 +628,12 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 			fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__);
 	} else {
 		/* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */
-		if (BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) <
-		    BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+		if (BN_num_bits(server_n) <
+		    BN_num_bits(host_n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
 			fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: server_key %d < host_key %d + "
 			    "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
-			    BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n),
-			    BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n),
+			    BN_num_bits(server_n),
+			    BN_num_bits(host_n),
 			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
 		}
 		if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa) != 0 ||

sshconnect2.c

@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 #endif
+	/* XXX free myproposal ?? */
 }
 
 /*

sshkey.c

@@ -275,10 +275,10 @@ sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k)
 	case KEY_RSA1:
 	case KEY_RSA:
 	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-		return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
+		return RSA_bits(k->rsa);
 	case KEY_DSA:
 	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-		return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
+		return DSA_bits(k->dsa);
 	case KEY_ECDSA:
 	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
 		return sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid);
@@ -478,11 +478,7 @@ sshkey_new(int type)
 	case KEY_RSA1:
 	case KEY_RSA:
 	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-		if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL ||
-		    (rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-		    (rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-			if (rsa != NULL)
-				RSA_free(rsa);
+		if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
 			free(k);
 			return NULL;
 		}
@@ -490,13 +486,7 @@ sshkey_new(int type)
 		break;
 	case KEY_DSA:
 	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-		if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL ||
-		    (dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-		    (dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-		    (dsa->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-		    (dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-			if (dsa != NULL)
-				DSA_free(dsa);
+		if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) {
 			free(k);
 			return NULL;
 		}
@@ -536,21 +526,10 @@ sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *k)
 	case KEY_RSA1:
 	case KEY_RSA:
 	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-#define bn_maybe_alloc_failed(p) (p == NULL && (p = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->d) ||
-		    bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->iqmp) ||
-		    bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->q) ||
-		    bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->p) ||
-		    bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmq1) ||
-		    bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmp1))
-			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		break;
 	case KEY_DSA:
 	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-		if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->dsa->priv_key))
-			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		break;
-#undef bn_maybe_alloc_failed
 	case KEY_ECDSA:
 	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
 		/* Cannot do anything until we know the group */
@@ -669,17 +648,31 @@ sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 	case KEY_RSA1:
 	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-	case KEY_RSA:
-		return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
-		    BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
-		    BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
+	case KEY_RSA: {
+			const BIGNUM *a_e, *a_n, *b_e, *b_n;
+
+			if (a->rsa == NULL || b->rsa == NULL)
+				return 0;
+			RSA_get0_key(a->rsa, &a_n, &a_e, NULL);
+			RSA_get0_key(b->rsa, &b_n, &b_e, NULL);
+			return BN_cmp(a_e, b_e) == 0 && BN_cmp(a_n, b_n) == 0;
+		}
 	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-	case KEY_DSA:
-		return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
-		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 &&
-		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 &&
-		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 &&
-		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0;
+	case KEY_DSA: {
+			const BIGNUM *a_p, *a_q, *a_g, *a_pub_key;
+			const BIGNUM *b_p, *b_q, *b_g, *b_pub_key;
+
+			if (a->dsa == NULL || b->dsa == NULL)
+				return 0;
+			DSA_get0_pqg(a->dsa, &a_p, &a_q, &a_g);
+			DSA_get0_key(a->dsa, &a_pub_key, NULL);
+			DSA_get0_pqg(b->dsa, &b_p, &b_q, &b_g);
+			DSA_get0_key(b->dsa, &b_pub_key, NULL);
+			return BN_cmp(a_p, b_p) == 0 &&
+			    BN_cmp(a_q, b_q) == 0 &&
+			    BN_cmp(a_g, b_g) == 0 &&
+			    BN_cmp(a_pub_key, b_pub_key) == 0;
+		}
 # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
 	case KEY_ECDSA:
@@ -754,15 +747,21 @@ to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain)
 			return ret;
 		break;
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-	case KEY_DSA:
-		if (key->dsa == NULL)
-			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-		if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
-		    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 ||
-		    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 ||
-		    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 ||
-		    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0)
-			return ret;
+	case KEY_DSA: {
+			const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key;
+
+			if (key->dsa == NULL)
+				return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+			DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+			DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
+			if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
+			    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, p)) != 0 ||
+			    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, q)) != 0 ||
+			    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, g)) != 0 ||
+			    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, pub_key)) != 0)
+				return ret;
+		}
 		break;
 # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 	case KEY_ECDSA:
@@ -775,13 +774,18 @@ to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain)
 			return ret;
 		break;
 # endif
-	case KEY_RSA:
-		if (key->rsa == NULL)
-			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-		if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
-		    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-		    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
-			return ret;
+	case KEY_RSA: {
+			const BIGNUM *e, *n;
+
+			if (key->rsa == NULL)
+				return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+			RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+			if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
+			    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, e)) != 0 ||
+			    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, n)) != 0)
+				return ret;
+		}
 		break;
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 	case KEY_ED25519:
@@ -887,8 +891,13 @@ sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
 
 	if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) {
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-		int nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n);
-		int elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e);
+		const BIGNUM *n, *e;
+		int nlen, elen;
+
+		RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+
+		nlen = BN_num_bytes(n);
+		elen = BN_num_bytes(e);
 
 		if (nlen < 0 || elen < 0 || nlen >= INT_MAX - elen) {
 			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
@@ -899,8 +908,8 @@ sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
 			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob);
-		BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen);
+		BN_bn2bin(n, blob);
+		BN_bn2bin(e, blob + nlen);
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 	} else if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1)) != 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -1239,6 +1248,7 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
 	struct sshbuf *blob;
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	u_long bits;
+	BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL;
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
 
 	if (ret == NULL)
@@ -1255,12 +1265,21 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
 		    bits == 0 || bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
 			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;	/* Bad bit count... */
 		/* Get public exponent, public modulus. */
-		if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->e)) < 0)
+		if ((e = BN_new()) == NULL || (n = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+			BN_free(e);
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		}
+		if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, e)) < 0)
 			return r;
-		if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->n)) < 0)
+		if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, n)) < 0)
 			return r;
+		if (RSA_set0_key(ret->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0) {
+			BN_free(e);
+			BN_free(n);
+			return -1;
+		}
 		/* validate the claimed number of bits */
-		if (BN_num_bits(ret->rsa->n) != (int)bits)
+		if (BN_num_bits(n) != (int)bits)
 			return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
 		*cpp = ep;
 		retval = 0;
@@ -1425,19 +1444,20 @@ sshkey_format_rsa1(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	u_int bits = 0;
 	char *dec_e = NULL, *dec_n = NULL;
+	const BIGNUM *e, *n;
 
-	if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL ||
-	    key->rsa->n == NULL) {
+	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+	if (key->rsa == NULL || e == NULL || n == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL ||
-	    (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) {
+	if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(e)) == NULL ||
+	    (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(n)) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	/* size of modulus 'n' */
-	if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) {
+	if ((bits = BN_num_bits(n)) <= 0) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -1769,15 +1789,32 @@ sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp)
 	switch (k->type) {
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 	case KEY_DSA:
-	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-		if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL)
-			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-		if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) ||
-		    (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) ||
-		    (BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) ||
-		    (BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL)) {
-			sshkey_free(n);
-			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	case KEY_DSA_CERT: {
+			const BIGNUM *k_p, *k_q, *k_g, *k_pub_key;
+			BIGNUM *n_p = NULL, *n_q = NULL, *n_g = NULL, *n_pub_key = NULL;
+
+			if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL)
+				return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+			DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &k_p, &k_q, &k_g);
+			DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &k_pub_key, NULL);
+
+			if (((n_p = BN_dup(k_p)) == NULL) ||
+			    ((n_q = BN_dup(k_q)) == NULL) ||
+			    ((n_g = BN_dup(k_g)) == NULL) ||
+			    (DSA_set0_pqg(n->dsa, n_p, n_q, n_g) == 0)) {
+				sshkey_free(n);
+				BN_free(n_p);
+				BN_free(n_q);
+				BN_free(n_g);
+				return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			}
+			if (((n_pub_key = BN_dup(k_pub_key)) == NULL) ||
+			    (DSA_set0_key(n->dsa, n_pub_key, NULL) == 0)) {
+				sshkey_free(n);
+				BN_free(n_pub_key);
+				return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			}
 		}
 		break;
 # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
@@ -1800,13 +1837,22 @@ sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp)
 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
 	case KEY_RSA:
 	case KEY_RSA1:
-	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-		if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL)
-			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-		if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) ||
-		    (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL)) {
-			sshkey_free(n);
-			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	case KEY_RSA_CERT: {
+			const BIGNUM *k_n, *k_e;
+			BIGNUM *n_n = NULL, *n_e = NULL;
+
+			if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL)
+				return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+			RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &k_n, &k_e, NULL);
+			if (((n_n = BN_dup(k_n)) == NULL) ||
+			    ((n_e = BN_dup(k_e)) == NULL) ||
+			    RSA_set0_key(n->rsa, n_n, n_e, NULL) == 0) {
+				sshkey_free(n);
+				BN_free(n_n);
+				BN_free(n_e);
+				return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			}
 		}
 		break;
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
@@ -2004,10 +2050,20 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
 			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e) != 0 ||
-		    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n) != 0) {
-			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-			goto out;
+		{
+			BIGNUM *e, *n;
+
+			e = BN_new();
+			n = BN_new();
+			if (e == NULL || n == NULL ||
+			    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, e) != 0 ||
+			    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, n) != 0 ||
+			    RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0) {
+				BN_free(e);
+				BN_free(n);
+				ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+				goto out;
+			}
 		}
 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
 		RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
@@ -2025,12 +2081,34 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
 			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p) != 0 ||
-		    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q) != 0 ||
-		    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g) != 0 ||
-		    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key) != 0) {
-			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-			goto out;
+		{
+			BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key;
+
+			p = BN_new();
+			q = BN_new();
+			g = BN_new();
+			pub_key = BN_new();
+
+			if (p == NULL || q == NULL || g == NULL ||
+			    pub_key == NULL ||
+			    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, p) != 0 ||
+			    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, q) != 0 ||
+			    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, g) != 0 ||
+			    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, pub_key) != 0 ||
+			    DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, p, q, g) == 0) {
+				BN_free(p);
+				BN_free(q);
+				BN_free(g);
+				BN_free(pub_key);
+				ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			if (DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, pub_key, NULL) == 0) {
+				BN_free(pub_key);
+				ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+				goto out;
+			}
 		}
 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
 		DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8);
@@ -2270,26 +2348,53 @@ sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **dkp)
 			goto fail;
 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
 	case KEY_RSA1:
-	case KEY_RSA:
-		if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL ||
-		    (pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL ||
-		    (pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL) {
-			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-			goto fail;
+	case KEY_RSA: {
+			const BIGNUM *k_e, *k_n;
+			BIGNUM *pk_e = NULL, *pk_n = NULL;
+
+			RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &k_n, &k_e, NULL);
+			if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (pk_e = BN_dup(k_e)) == NULL ||
+			    (pk_n = BN_dup(k_n)) == NULL ||
+			    RSA_set0_key(pk->rsa, pk_n, pk_e, NULL) == 0) {
+				BN_free(pk_e);
+				BN_free(pk_n);
+				ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+				goto fail;
 			}
+		}
 		break;
 	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
 		if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0)
 			goto fail;
 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
-	case KEY_DSA:
-		if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL ||
-		    (pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL ||
-		    (pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL ||
-		    (pk->dsa->g = BN_dup(k->dsa->g)) == NULL ||
-		    (pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) {
-			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-			goto fail;
+	case KEY_DSA: {
+			const BIGNUM *k_p, *k_q, *k_g, *k_pub_key;
+			BIGNUM *pk_p = NULL, *pk_q = NULL, *pk_g = NULL;
+			BIGNUM *pk_pub_key = NULL;
+
+			DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &k_p, &k_q, &k_g);
+			DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &k_pub_key, NULL);
+
+			if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (pk_p = BN_dup(k_p)) == NULL ||
+			    (pk_q = BN_dup(k_q)) == NULL ||
+			    (pk_g = BN_dup(k_g)) == NULL ||
+			    (pk_pub_key = BN_dup(k_pub_key)) == NULL ||
+			    DSA_set0_pqg(pk->dsa, pk_p, pk_q, pk_g) == 0) {
+				BN_free(pk_p);
+				BN_free(pk_q);
+				BN_free(pk_g);
+				BN_free(pk_pub_key);
+				ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+
+			if (DSA_set0_key(pk->dsa, pk_pub_key, NULL) == 0) {
+				BN_free(pk_pub_key);
+				ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+				goto fail;
+			}
 		}
 		break;
 	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
@@ -2410,12 +2515,17 @@ sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg)
 	/* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */
 	switch (k->type) {
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-		if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->p)) != 0 ||
-		    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->q)) != 0 ||
-		    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->g)) != 0 ||
-		    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0)
-			goto out;
+	case KEY_DSA_CERT: {
+			const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key;
+
+			DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+			DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
+			if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, p)) != 0 ||
+			    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, q)) != 0 ||
+			    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, g)) != 0 ||
+			    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, pub_key)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
 		break;
 # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
@@ -2427,10 +2537,15 @@ sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg)
 			goto out;
 		break;
 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-		if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-		    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->n)) != 0)
-			goto out;
+	case KEY_RSA_CERT: {
+			const BIGNUM *e, *n;
+
+			RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+			if (e == NULL || n == NULL ||
+			    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, e)) != 0 ||
+			    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, n)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
 		break;
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
@@ -2587,43 +2702,65 @@ sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
 		goto out;
 	switch (key->type) {
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-	case KEY_RSA:
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0)
-			goto out;
+	case KEY_RSA: {
+			const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *iqmp, *p, *q;
+			RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, &d);
+			RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &iqmp);
+			RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &p, &q);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, n)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, e)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, d)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, p)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, q)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
 		break;
 	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
 		if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
 			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0)
-			goto out;
+		{
+			const BIGNUM *d, *iqmp, *p, *q;
+
+			RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
+			RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &p, &q);
+			RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &iqmp);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, d)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, p)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, q)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
 		break;
-	case KEY_DSA:
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0)
-			goto out;
+	case KEY_DSA: {
+			const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key;
+
+			DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+			DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, p)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, q)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, g)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, pub_key)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, priv_key)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
 		break;
 	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
 		if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
 			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0)
-			goto out;
+		{
+			const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+			DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, priv_key)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
 		break;
 # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 	case KEY_ECDSA:
@@ -2699,18 +2836,51 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
 			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->p)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->q)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->g)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0)
-			goto out;
+		{
+			BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key;
+
+			p = BN_new();
+			q = BN_new();
+			g = BN_new();
+			pub_key = BN_new();
+			priv_key = BN_new();
+			if (p == NULL || q == NULL || g == NULL ||
+			    pub_key == NULL || priv_key == NULL ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, p)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, q)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, g)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, pub_key)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, priv_key)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = ((DSA_set0_pqg(k->dsa, p, q, g) == 0)
+			    ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0)) != 0) {
+				BN_free(p);
+				BN_free(q);
+				BN_free(g);
+				BN_free(pub_key);
+				BN_free(priv_key);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, pub_key, priv_key) == 0) {
+				r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+				BN_free(pub_key);
+				BN_free(priv_key);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
 		break;
-	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-		if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0)
-			goto out;
+	case KEY_DSA_CERT: {
+			BIGNUM *priv_key = BN_new();
+
+			if (priv_key == NULL ||
+			    (r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, priv_key)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = ((DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, NULL, priv_key) == 0)
+			    ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0)) != 0) {
+				BN_free(priv_key);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
 		break;
 # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 	case KEY_ECDSA:
@@ -2769,24 +2939,84 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
 			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0)
-			goto out;
+		{
+			BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *iqmp, *p, *q;
+
+			n = BN_new();
+			e = BN_new();
+			d = BN_new();
+			iqmp = BN_new();
+			p = BN_new();
+			q = BN_new();
+
+			if (n == NULL || e == NULL || d == NULL ||
+			    iqmp == NULL || p == NULL || q == NULL ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, n)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, e)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, d)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, p)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, q)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = ((RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, n, e, d) == 0)
+			    ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0)) != 0) {
+				BN_free(n);
+				BN_free(e);
+				BN_free(d);
+				BN_free(iqmp);
+				BN_free(p);
+				BN_free(q);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, p, q) == 0) {
+				r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+				BN_free(iqmp);
+				BN_free(p);
+				BN_free(q);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa, iqmp)) != 0) {
+				BN_free(iqmp);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
 		break;
-	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-		if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0)
-			goto out;
+	case KEY_RSA_CERT: {
+			BIGNUM *d, *iqmp, *p, *q;
+
+			/* N and E are already set so make sure we will not overwrite them */
+			d = BN_new();
+			iqmp = BN_new();
+			p = BN_new();
+			q = BN_new();
+
+			if (d == NULL || iqmp == NULL || p == NULL ||
+			    q == NULL ||
+			    (r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, d)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, p)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, q)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = ((RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, d) == 0)
+			        ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0)) != 0) {
+				BN_free(d);
+				BN_free(iqmp);
+				BN_free(p);
+				BN_free(q);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, p, q) == 0) {
+			        r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+				BN_free(p);
+				BN_free(q);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa, iqmp) != 0) {
+			        r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+				free(iqmp);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
 		break;
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 	case KEY_ED25519:
@@ -3421,6 +3651,7 @@ sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
 	struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
 	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
 	u_char *cp;
+	const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *q, *p, *iqmp;
 
 	/*
 	 * If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting
@@ -3447,10 +3678,13 @@ sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
 	 * format would just give known plaintext).
 	 * Note: q and p are stored in reverse order to SSL.
 	 */
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->q)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->p)) != 0)
+	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, &d);
+	RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &p, &q);
+	RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &iqmp);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, d)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, q)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, p)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Pad the part to be encrypted to a size that is a multiple of 8. */
@@ -3475,9 +3709,9 @@ sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Store public key.  This will be in plain text. */
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, BN_num_bits(n))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, e)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3604,6 +3838,7 @@ sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob,
 	int r;
 	struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
 	struct sshbuf *copy = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL;
 
 	if (keyp != NULL)
 		*keyp = NULL;
@@ -3633,10 +3868,16 @@ sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Read the public key from the buffer. */
-	if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->e)) != 0)
+	if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, e)) != 0 ||
+	    RSA_set0_key(pub->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0) {
+		BN_free(n);
+		BN_free(e);
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* Finally, the comment */
 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(copy, (u_char**)commentp, NULL)) != 0)
@@ -3668,6 +3909,8 @@ sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase,
 	struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
 	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
 	struct sshkey *prv = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL,
+	    *iqmp = NULL;
 
 	if (keyp != NULL)
 		*keyp = NULL;
@@ -3703,11 +3946,17 @@ sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Read the public key and comment from the buffer. */
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 ||	/* key bits */
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+	if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 ||	/* key bits */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &comment, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    RSA_set0_key(prv->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0) {
+		BN_free(n);
+		BN_free(e);
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* Check that it is a supported cipher. */
 	cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_type);
@@ -3736,15 +3985,33 @@ sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase,
 	}
 
 	/* Read the rest of the private key. */
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->q)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->p)) != 0)
+	if ((d = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, d)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, q)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, p)) != 0 ||
+	    (RSA_set0_key(prv->rsa, NULL, NULL, d) == 0)) {
+		BN_free(d);
+		BN_free(p);
+		BN_free(q);
+		BN_free(iqmp);
 		goto out;
+	}
+	if (RSA_set0_factors(prv->rsa, p, q) == 0) {
+		BN_free(p);
+		BN_free(q);
+		BN_free(iqmp);
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* calculate p-1 and q-1 */
-	if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(prv->rsa)) != 0)
+	if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(prv->rsa, iqmp)) != 0) {
+		BN_free(iqmp);
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* enable blinding */
 	if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
@@ -3817,7 +4084,9 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
 			case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
 				r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
 				goto out;
+#ifdef EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR
 			case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR:
+#endif
 			case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR:
 #ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR
 			case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR:
@@ -3835,7 +4104,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
+	if (EVP_PKEY_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
 	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) {
 		if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
 			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
@@ -3850,7 +4119,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
 			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 			goto out;
 		}
-	} else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
+	} else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
 	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
 		if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
 			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
@@ -3862,7 +4131,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
 		DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8);
 #endif
 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-	} else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
+	} else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
 	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) {
 		if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
 			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;